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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the past decade, debates on Turkish foreign policy have been mostly
focused on the considerable changes Turkey has gone through after the rise to power
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkish foreign policy in the pre-AKP
era tended to limit Turkey’s relations with the surrounding regions, whereas the
policy in the AKP era gears towards rapprochement with Turkey’s neighbors. The
foreign policy of the AKP seems to make Turkey an active player attempting to
engage with the surrounding regions, especially the Middle East. This attempt of the
AKP to pursue a new foreign policy strategy raises questions about Turkey’s new
position as part of the Middle Eastern region, which is contrary to its traditional
peripheral role.
Countries like Turkey, which are at the periphery of different regions, are
identified as outlier states. And they normally play a conspicuous role in the system,
thus making it difficult to identify them as part of any particular region. In Buzan and
Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), these outlier states are called
“insulators”. Insulators are not located in the regional security complex but rather sit
in-between two or more regional security complexes.1 Furthermore, insulators also
play a passive role: either by inhibiting the zone of relative indifference or absorbing
the energy of RSCs’ periphery.2 Turkey is acknowledged by Buzan and Waever as an
insulator because it is located at the periphery of three RSCs—the EU, the Middle
East, and the ex-Soviet. Despite its active participation in the surrounding RSCs, it
remains an insulator because, according to these authors, it is not able to bring
1
2

Buzan, Regions and powers, 483.
Ibid., 485.
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different regional security complexes together to form its own strategic arena or to
clearly present itself as a pole in any regional security complex. 3 According to
RSCT, a pole is a state that is a part of the Regional Security Complex.
Regional Security Complex Theory may have been accurate in portraying
Turkey’s regional position in the last decades but it is unclear whether this positioning
is still appropriate for Turkey under the rule of the Justice and Development Party
(AKP). This is because Buzan and Waever positioned Turkey as an insulator back in
2003 when they introduced RSCT as a grand theory in their book, Regions and
Powers. Since 2003 Turkey has undergone various changes and witnessed many
foreign policy initiatives by the AKP government. Therefore, the role of Turkey as an
insulator should be reconsidered.
This research proposes to reconsider the position of Turkey by using
comparative analysis. Turkish foreign policy in the pre-AKP era and the AKP era will
be explored to see evidence of policy changes or continuity. The comparison will be
focused on three main themes: the Israeli-Palestinian issue, nuclear policy and the
Islamic agenda to assess the interconnectedness of Turkey and the Middle East in the
societal and the political sectors. In order to see if the AKP has been the main factor
that led to these changes, the research will then analyze dynamics that led to changes
in Turkish foreign policy under the rule of the AKP by looking into two different
levels: systemic and domestic. By doing so, the research will differentiate between
changes in Turkish foreign policy that are primarily reactive and/or determined by
changes in the international and regional structure and those that are related explicitly
to AKP policies.

3
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Research Question
Recent debates about Turkey continue to be centered on the transformation of
Turkish foreign policy after the AKP came to power. These changes raised questions
about Turkey’s position as an insulator in the Regional Security Complex Theory.
This is because the changes of foreign policy made by the AKP has developed new
approach towards Turkey’s surrounding regional security complexes especially the
Middle East RSC. In order to put Turkey after the rise to power of the AKP into a
correct category in the RSCT, its position as an insulator has to be reevaluated by
examining the foreign policy of the AKP.
The main question of the proposed thesis is: Does Turkey under the rule of the
AKP still fit the category of insulator in the Regional Security Complex Theory? In
addition, sub-questions will be asked as well in order to help guide the proposed
thesis further: Is AKP foreign policy reactive or proactive? Is AKP the main catalyst
that led to Turkish foreign policy change?
Hypothesis
My key hypothesis is Turkey does not fit anymore in the category of insulator
in Buzan and Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory because the AKP has
reformulated Turkish foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, nuclear policy
and the Islamic agenda, which has transformed Turkey into a pole in the Middle
Eastern RSC. According to Buzan and Waever’s RSCT, a country can only be
promoted to regional power status if it first becomes a pole in the RSC. 4 And for this

4

Buzan, Regions and powers, 394-395.

6
to happen, the country has to be engaged with the processes of securitization or
desecuritization that interconnect the countries in the RSC.5
Several successful Turkish-European integration attempts such as Turkey’s
accession to NATO and free trade agreement with the EEC were driven by US
external pressure to manage the threat of the Soviet in the region not by European
security dynamics.6 Therefore, without this pressure resulting from Cold War rivalry,
Turkey seems to face several problems hindering it from becoming the EU member as
can be seen from the 2005 accession negotiation with the EU. The EU’s resistance to
Turkey’s membership resulted from the fear that Turkey would threaten the regional
order and the “concentric circles” structure of the EU RSC.7 This is because Turkey, a
country with large population and strong growing economy, has the potential to shift
the barycenter of this RSC to the east.8 The fear of an increasing number of Islamic
immigrants to Europe is another significant dynamic that obstructs Turkey’s
accession.9 Besides these reasons that hinder Turkey’s accession to the EU, Turkey’s
strategy of using Cyprus as a security concern has no effect on the EU RSC structure;
this is because the threat from Greco-Turkish conflict is too small to threaten the
actors in the center of the complex; Greece is a relatively weak state and the Cyprus
issue seems to be more concerned about the domestic security of Greece and Turkey
instead of a regional one.10 Therefore, the Greco-Turkish conflict could hardly be
widened into a regional security issue that would raise concerns from the center of the
complex. As a result of these reasons, Turkey’s integration into the EU RSC seems

5
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far from possible, and therefore there has been less enthusiasm about Turkish
accession to the EU.
The difficulties in achieving the EU membership together with obstacles to
operate proactive policies in the Caucasus and in Central Asia due to ‘Turkey’s
increasing dependency on Russia’s energy resources and Moscow’s swift recovery
after the war in Chechnya’11 made the Middle East the only remaining area where
Turkey can exercise its activism. In addition to that, the power vacuum that resulted
from the erosion of the US power after the Iraq war also provided Turkey with the
opportunity to fill this vacuum. Since then Turkey under the rule of the AKP began to
actively get involved with several issues in the Middle East Security Complex.
The rapprochement with the Middle East has been done through Turkey’s shift
of policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue, nuclear policy and the Islamic agenda.
The key unifying dynamic within the Middle East is the solidarity with the Palestinian
cause; therefore the AKP began to securitize the Israeli-Palestinian issue, which
consequently led to a period of increasing tension between Turkey and Israel. The
change of Turkey’s stance signaled its alignment more closely with the Middle East.
Another unifying dynamic is Islam as the shared identity that facilitates the
construction of ‘us’ versus the ‘other’ in the region. For this reason, the “Islamic
agenda” became an important card for Turkey in order to affiliate with the Middle
Eastern RSC. Without the stress on Islamic identity, Turkey can be perceived as
‘other’ among the Muslim countries in the region, which can result in the loss of
interests Turkey could benefit from the Middle Eastern RSC. Therefore, the AKP
intensified its Islamic agenda by attempting to position Turkey as a champion for
Islamic rights in the region by using its economic story and successful development of
11
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democracy. Such stories are the clear proof that Islamic identity and liberalization can
co-evolve.12 For this reason, the AKP assumed the leading role in the region as a
model of successful Muslim country. Nuclear policy is one of the major securitized
issues in the Middle Eastern RSC. Turkey is involved in this issue through the AKP’s
support of Iranian nuclear fuel program and the defence of Iran over attacks from the
UN.13 The change of Turkey’s stance on this issue explicitly shows that Turkey chose
to identify its security concern more closely with its neighbor and the Middle East.
Having this been said, the AKP and its foreign policy have transformed Turkey from
an insulator to a pole in the Middle Eastern RSC.
Literature Review
The AKP’s foreign policy orientation
Under the rule of the AKP, there have been different debates on the
orientation of the Turkish foreign policy. Scholars focused primarily on the
characteristics of the new foreign policy since it seems to completely deviate from its
traditional trend on passive approach deriving from Ataturk’s pronounced motto,
“peace at home peace in the world”14. Even though at times, in the Turkish history,
there have been several attempts for active engagement in the surrounding regions,
there has not been a clear break from Turkey’s traditional policy of non alignment.15
The hold on this long-established foreign policy of neutrality has not waned until the
era of the AKP rule that began in 2002. When the AKP came to power, there has been
an increased active involvement in the regions surrounding Turkey, which was

12
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directed under the AKP’s doctrine of “Strategic Depth”.16 Even though the foreign
policy of the AKP put a strong emphasis on active involvement in all regions, its main
focus during the first term seemed to be toward the European Security Complex due
to Turkey’s EU accession bid. However, there was a change in Turkey’s policy
direction toward the EU RSC in the AKP’s second term because there were various
obstacles barring Turkey from joining the EU. In addition to that, Turkey’s
membership met fierce opposition from various European states and negative signals
from European elites and public. For this reason, the AKP tended to increasingly
concentrate on the Middle East security complex instead. As a result, these
developments raised questions about the axis shift in Turkish foreign policy.
The literature about the orientation of Turkish foreign policy can be mainly
divided into three directions. The first direction argues that Turkish foreign policy
remains unchanged even after the AKP came to power. The second direction argues
that the change in the AKP’s foreign policy is a direct impact of Turkey’s
Europeanization. And the last direction argues that the AKP’s foreign policy is
implemented to promote increasing engagement with the Middle East.
Tarik Oguzlu, Nichilas Danforth, and Emiliano Alessandri all argue that there
has been no axis shift in the AKP foreign policy, and that changes were done on the
basis of pragmatism. They argue that Turkish foreign policy since the time of Kemal
Ataturk had been focusing exclusively on the involvement with the West. This
traditional foreign policy of the country was done on the basis of pragmatism with an
aim to modernize and secularize the country. Active engagement with other
surrounding regions, especially with the Middle East, was not a priority due to the

16
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fear that Islam could prevent Turkey from becoming modernized and secularized.17
However, in the later period, there was more focus on active engagement with other
surrounding regions particularly the Middle East, for example, under the presidency
of Turgut Ozal in the 1990s, which focused on the improvement of relation with the
Middle East on the economic basis since Arab countries were important markets for
Turkish export products. 18 Thus, from this perspective, the decision under AKP
leadership to become more active in the relation with the Middle East should not be
seen as a truly new development but rather a pragmatic move to exploit opportunities
to seek for Turkish best interest after Turkey faced problem with the EU accession.
Closer ties with the Middle East were developed in a way that serves Turkey’s best
interest without leading to the point of irreconcilable relation with the EU, Israel, or
the US.19 Even though there was a problem with Turkey’s accession to the EU, the
AKP did not completely give up on this attempt because they realized the importance
of economic and political benefits that they would get from the membership.
More specifically, Nicholas Dansforth stresses on the importance of interests
rather than ideology in the AKP foreign policy changes.20 He believes that there was
an overemphasis on domestic identity in analyzing AKP policy, which led to the
excessive focus on the ideational factor (Islam).21 Oguzlu sees the AKP foreign policy
as an attempt of “Middle Easternization”. However, this move does not suggest a
break from the West but rather a way to deal with the growing negative impact of
political development in the region to pave a smoother way for its accession.22 In his
view, Turkey’s accession to the EU is still a distant possibility due to the growing
17
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threat and insecurity from the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey under the AKP sped up
its active relation with the Middle East with an aim to help adopt peace and stability
in the region.23 Emili Alessandri’s view on AKP foreign policy also highlights this
pragmatic approach. She sees the AKP foreign policy as a continuation of Turkey’s
quest for a new place in the post-Cold War era. She views policy activism in the
Middle East as a source of empowerment for Turkey’s position, which could help
elevate the importance of Turkey in the eyes of the West after the rivalry between the
two superpowers ended in the regions.24
The second line of argument toward the AKP foreign policy is based on
Europeanization. Ziya Onis and Benli Altunisik’s arguments on the AKP foreign
policy focus on transformation through Europeanization. Onis explains that in the first
era of the AKP, Turkish foreign policy was mainly attached to the European
dimension. Turkey went through the EU reform process to comply with the criteria
set by the EU so that Turkey could be granted membership in the EU. 25 The process
of Europeanization of Turkey can be seen from its use of soft power through its
adoption of EU’s foreign policy norms in conducting relations with other countries.
However, the change took place in the second term of the AKP in power when the EU
as a reference point began to lose its prominence due to the opposition to Turkey’s
EU accession bid. In Onis’ analysis, this change does not mean the abandonment of
the Europeannization process but rather a change of commitment from “deep
Europeanization” to “loose Europeanization”.26 The AKP could not completely give
up on this attempt because they realized the importance of economic and political
benefits that they will get from the membership. Altunisik, on the other hands, sees
23
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the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy under a different light. He argues that
Europeanization means the “internalization of foreign policy norms of the EU.”27 The
AKP put an effort on policy activism in the Middle East, which is mostly based on
multilateral diplomacy, soft power, conflict management, and resolution roles 28 He
interprets these attempts of the AKP in conducting relations with the Middle East as
the process of Europeanization because the AKP used foreign policy norms of the EU
to involve and solve conflicts in the Middle East. He also stresses that Turkey’s more
active relation with the Middle East does not contradict Turkey’s relation with the EU
and does not mean that the AKP would give up its accession.
The third line of argument highlights the AKP foreign policy as a shift
towards the Middle East. Bulen Aras, Andre Bank, Soner Cagaptay, and Sevket
Ovah’s arguments lie in this approach. They believe that the Middle East has become
a central focus in Turkish foreign policy especially after the opposition to Turkey’s
EU accession bid. Turkey’s new ruling elites implanted policies that are radically
different from the previous era, particularly towards the Middle East. Within a decade
the AKP has transformed Turkey into an important player in the region through
numbers of efforts such as the securitization of the Palestinian question, the
improvement of its relation with Syria and Iran to solve the Kurdish problem, the
expansion of trade relations and cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries, and
the promotion of Turkish model in the Middle East especially after the Arab Spring.29
Sevket Ovah and Bulen Aras argue that the AKP reformulated its Turkish foreign
policy to be actively engaged with the Middle East because the party’s self perception

27
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and ideology are different from the previous era. 30 Andre Bank stresses Turkey’s
position in the Middle East as a regional leader since 2007; he calls it “Ankara
Moment.” 31 In his sense, the “Ankara Moment” emerged as a result of domestic
political economy factors and the regional development such as demilitarization,
economic successes, the erosion of the US power in the region, and the lack of
democracy in region. 32 These dynamics provided Turkey with a chance to penetrate
into the region and promote itself as the model of Muslim democracy and economic
liberalization.33 According to Soner Cagaptay, even if the AKP implemented an active
foreign policy with the surrounding regions based on the principle of “strategic
depth”, their main focus is the Middle East. This is because the AKP perceived the
world as composed of regional blocs and they saw their best interest lied in the
Middle Eastern region. Therefore, their policies were implanted with an aim to get
more actively engaged with the Middle east rather than embracing the Ottoman realm
as a whole.34
Even though there have been many academic studies on the AKP foreign
policy reorientation, none has been based on Buzan and Waever’s RSCT sectoral
approach as a theoretical framework. Buzan and Waever’s RSCT is one of the most
influential theories that was developed to explain the increased relevance of regional
politics, thus it is helpful in explaining politics from the regional level of analysis.
The proposed thesis aims to fill this gap by using this framework in analyzing AKP
foreign policy to establish the understanding of Turkey’s position in the context of
regional security.
30

Ovali, “Decoding Turkey's Lust for Regional Clout in the Middle East”, 16.
André, “The Ankara Moment”, 287.
32
André, “The Ankara Moment”, 289.
33
Ibid., 299.
34
Cagaptay, “Turkey Changes, By the Numbers”; http://www.cagaptay.com/739/turkey-changes-bythe-numbers. accessed 05/07/2013.
31

14
Chapter Outline
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter two explains the theoretical
background of Buzan and Weaver’s Regional Security Complex Theory and analyzes
the Middle East region as a regional security complex. Apart from that, this chapter
also explains reasons that led to the adoption of a regional perspective to security
studies. Chapter three explores the role of the Islamic agenda in Turkish foreign
policy. This chapter compares Turkey’s stance toward the issue in the pre-AKP era
and the AKP era by investigating Turkish foreign policy in both eras, concluding that
Turkey in the AKP era tended to engage more with the Islamic agenda and therefore
revealing a new, stronger connection between Turkey and the Middle Eastern
Security Complex. In addition to that this chapter also analyzes the determinants of
changes to differentiate changes that are primarily reactive and those that are related
explicitly to the AKP policies. In Chapter four, Turkish foreign policy concerning the
Israeli-Palestinian issue will be examined. This chapter investigates Turkish foreign
policy with regards to issue in the pre-AKP era and the AKP era to compare the
stance and the framing of the issue in two different periods. In addition to that, it
delves more into the Turkish-Israeli relation because it is an important factor for
understanding how Turkey approached the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The two
phases of the Turkish-Israeli relation, one in the pre-AKP era and the other on the
AKP era, reflect different stances of Turkey. The change depicts new priorities of
Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era. The new approach of the AKP that differs
from the traditional perspective leads to the repositioning of Turkey in the Middle
East, indicating the new connection between Turkey and the Middle Eastern Security
Complex. In addition to that, this chapter proceeds to analyze if the AKP has been the
main factor that led to the change of Turkey’s stance by analyzing the dynamics that

15
led to changes of Turkish foreign policy in two different levels: systemic and
domestic. Chapter five is mainly about Turkey’s nuclear policy. This chapter
compares Turkish foreign policy in two different periods to look for evidence of
continuity and change in Turkey’s stance toward the issue. Two phases of Turkey’s
stance concerning nuclear program in the Middle East especially Turkey’s stance
toward Iran’s nuclear program reveal the new approach of Turkey to the region and
the divergence between the AKP’s approach and the traditional stance. This change
has an impact on the positioning of Turkey in the Middle Eastern Regional Security
Complex because it led to the new connection between the Middle East RSC and the
Turkey. In addition to that, this chapter also analyzes the determinants of Turkey’s
policy change to differentiate between the changes that are determined by the
international and regional structure and those that are related explicitly to the AKP
policies. Finally, in Chapter six the main findings of the research are summarized.
Furthermore, this chapter provides a final overview of the impact of policy change on
Turkey’s role in the Middle East.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Background:
Regional Security Complex Theory and Turkey

Understanding Regionalism
The regional perspective had a limited role in mainstream IR because the
focus was mainly on the global level; liberals see the world through the concept of
internationalism, whereas realists take the state as a reference object and see the world
as the system of states.35 Nevertheless, regional perspective to security, which is
known as “Old Regionalism”, had a chance to arise in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The old regionalists identified three main explaining reasons that led to the interest in
regions. Firstly, decolonization led to the emergence of numbers of new states in the
international system.36 The new problems and tension accompanying the expansion of
the state system made mainstream IR unable to explain the new emerging dynamics
such as regional integration and regional order. Therefore, regionalism arose to
provide framework for the analysis of regional “subsystems”. Secondly, the European
Community (EC) heavily focused on regional integration.37 The EC was viewed as a
model of regional integration that other regions could follow. As a result, many
scholars decided to study the dynamics of the regional integration with specific
reference to the experience of the EC. Thirdly, the clout of superpower domination
especially of the US started to wane, due to the Vietnam War and the paralysis of

35
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Bretton Wood system.38 Without the meddling of the superpowers, there came a
chance for the regions to play some significant role in the system.
The concept of region in this period was loosely defined and weakly
conceptualized. There was little consensus among analysts on the basic definition of
region and attributes that constituted regional subsystem.39 For this reason, William
Thompson, one of the significant old regionalists, studied and analyzed the major
work in regional subsystem literature to construct a standardized definition and
identify core indicators of a region. According to his study, the four main variables of
a region are regular and intense interaction, geographic proximity, actor’s recognition
of the subsystem as a distinctive area, and a minimum of two actors.40 Regular and
intense interaction means interaction of national elites with the aim to develop closer
relations between nations.41 Geographic proximity is identifiable boundaries that are
territorially determined blocks.42 When the first two attributes pertain, the actor is
bound to be aware of the subsystemic distinctiveness.43 The regional subsystem
would have less heuristic value if the actor is unaware or ignorant of its existence.44
The membership threshold of regional subsystem, which is at the minimum of two, is
set to differentiate region from the nation-state system.45 Despite the awakening
interest in the regions and more studies on the literature, regionalism did not become a
permanent trend in the IR study because it started to wane in the 1980s after
bipolarity’s resumption.46 Nevertheless, the indicators of a region in the old
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regionalism were further developed and incorporated in the new regionalism, which
came to life again in the 1990s.
During the Cold War, regions were not treated as a significant actor in the
system because the focus shifted to the relationship between the two superpowers, the
US and the USSR. Because superpowers competition infiltrated into almost all of the
regions, the world was mainly divided into spheres of influence of the two.47 After the
end of the Cold War, the focus on the pattern of international security shifted towards
the regional level again. This is primarily because the fall of the USSR marked the
termination of power rivalry between the two superpowers (the US and the USSR)
that had been intruded in all regions.48 Without the clout and the meddling of the
super powers, regional relations expanded, opening venues for regional conflicts and
cooperation more than in the past.49 Moreover, security in the post-Cold War was
broadened to include many new agendas such as terrorism, ethnic nationalism and
extremism, religious fundamentalism, transnational organized crime, and illegal
migration.50 This new security environment after the Cold War was influence by
regional dynamics. Therefore, the need for regional perspective to security was
needed. Since the structure of regional security concentrates on different patterns of
international politics that the mainstream IR was unable to explain, a new agenda
named “New Regionalism” emerged. New Regionalism builds on previous regional
theory, yet adds some more new elements to it. The most important new feature of
New Regionalism is its multidimensional approach, based on the suggestion that
regions are built on many relevant dimensions such as environmental effect,
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identities, and trade partners.51 Therefore, regions in New Regionalism will have
different shapes and not to be confined to a single region.
Buzan and Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory
Regional Security Complex Theory is part of the new security studies and new
regionalism that was developed by Buzan and Waever to explain security in the post
Cold War that traditional security studies were not able to do.52 They provided a
theoretical framework to understand security at the regional level. They also
recognized the importance of geographic proximity, which is the approach of old
Regionalism. However, their concept of region is not defined by geographical
proximity only but also a shared characteristic in accordance with a functional
demand in various dimensions such as politico-security axes, economic interactions,
identity, and environmental externalities.
Regional Security Complex Theory was first developed by Barry Buzan in
“People, States and Fear” with an aim to provide a framework for security studies.53
In this book, “Regional Security Complexes” (RSCs) were introduced as “set[s] of
states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their
security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one
another”.54 Furthermore, interactions between states in the RSC created security
interdependence and the security interdependence is created within a geographically
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coherent grouping.55 This geographical proximity also becomes the boundaries of the
later modified version of RSCT.
In the following years, with the emergence of new security threats that led to
changes of regional and global security structures, Buzan and Weaver modified RSCT
to make it a more effective framework in analyzing security in the new era. The
modified RSCT is defined through a “securitization model”. In a securitization model,
the units are connected by the processes of securitization or desecuritization, which
create interdependence between units in terms of security.56 In the case of
securitization, the process only occurs when the actors choose to identify the issues or
problems as an existential threat; the problems themselves can never spontaneously or
automatically constitute threats to security.57 On the other hand, desecuritization is a
process that results in the exclusion of an issue or problem from the security agenda,
meaning that the issue or problem is no longer treated as an existential threat.58
Therefore, in RSCT whether problems or issues are treated as a threat or not depends
on the actors that “securitize” them. The processes of securitization and
desecuritization in RSCT have a social constructivist outlook. In Constructivism,
reality is not objective but rather constructed, thus it emphasizes the role of norms,
identity, and ideas because they have an impact on the meanings that are assigned to
material objects leading to action.59
Since security is viewed as socially constructed by securitizing actors, the
processes of security interdependence between actors are formed differently. Some
may be identified as friends, whereas others as enemies. There are different types of
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pattern of amity ranging from allies and friendship to protection and support, whereas
pattern of enmity resulted from fear and suspicion among securitizing actors.60
Patterns of amity and enmity play a significant role in defining a security complex. In
a regional security complex where pattern of amity prevails, there will be intense
security interdependence. This security interdependence will be in a form of positive
dependency, thus creating security community.61 On the contrary, in a regional
security complex where pattern of enmity prevails, the intensity of security
interdependence will be in a form of negative dependency. This will end up being a
conflict formation.62
Factors that significantly contribute to the construction of patterns of amity
and enmity are history and common culture. One of the examples of historical factor
is the long time enmity between Arabs and Jews, whereas the example of the common
culture are countries that belong to the same civilizational area such as Europe, South
America, and the Middle East.63 When these criteria for constructing pattern of amity
and enmity are applied, the identification of “other ” will be set. When “other” is
identified as being neutral, security interdependence will be normalized leading to the
formation of security community, whereas when the “other” is identified as being a
threat, security interdependence will be in a form of rivalry leading to a conflict
formation. In the RSCT, Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) are defined by
different patterns of security interdependence. This is for instance the EU RSC is
defined as “security community” since pattern of amity prevails in the security
complex, whereas the Middle East is defined as conflict formation because pattern of
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enmity prevails.64
In Buzan and Weaver’s Regional Security Complex Theory, the world
consists of three formations: Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), global level
powers, and insulator states.65 Buzan and Waever defined RSC as “a set of units
whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one
another.”66 They divided the world into nine distinct RSCs and each has its exclusive
members because states do not exist in two RSCs or overlap from one to
another.67Global level powers are the regional powers and the great powers whose
influence and capabilities can be exercised in all areas of the international system.68
While both powers differ in the scale of influence and capabilities, they both have the
ability to penetrate and play a role in the regional security complex.69
With regards to the concept of insulator, which is the primary focus of this
research, Buzan and Waever explained that an insulator is not located within a
regional security complex but rather sits at the margin between two or more regional
security complexes.70 Furthermore, insulators also play a passive role – either by
inhibiting the zone of relative indifference or absorbing the energy of RSCs’
periphery.71 In other words, the role of an insulator is to act as a border to separate
regional security dynamics from each other, preventing the spillover of security
interactions from one region to another.72 For a country to become part of the
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Regional Security Complex, there must be a degree of interconnectedness between its
processes of securitization or desecuritization and those of the other units in the
complex.73 For Buzan and Waever, such processes do not cover only the traditional
military and political sectors but also the economic, societal, and environmental
ones.74
Given this basic structure of the theory, the RSCT is obviously the most
comprehensive approach in understanding security at the regional level. However, the
theory met criticism particularly about its clear-cut notion of regional space. The way
Buzan and Weaver divided the world into several Regional Security Complexes with
numbers of states belonging to each raised questions about territorial construction of
the security region such as how to draw the line between the inside and outside?
When will the state be included or excluded from being part of the Regional Security
Complex? And why coherent grouping based in geographical location matters? The
clear-cut notion of regional space in the RSCT is not a flaw in the theory as criticized
because it is merely an analytical concept applied to help understand security
discourses and security practices of the actors more easily. This is because when
actors continue to belong to the same Regional Security Complex, there emerge
security interdependence. The actions undertaken by one actor in the region inevitably
produce repercussions for the other, regardless of whether amity or enmity is
involved.
The regional space that has been imposed in the theory is based on functionality in
terms of security interdependence between states. This means that the grouping of
states as a Regional Security Complex is socially constructed by the security practice
of the actors. And since threats tend to travel more easily over short distances than
73
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over the long ones, the grouping is more likely to be based in geographical proximity.
However, geographical proximity is not necessarily an exact guide to its members. A
regional security complex can surpass it. The borders of the Regional Security
Complex may vary according to how states construct them. Therefore, there can
always be a possibility that a Regional Security Complex can undergo transformation
concerning numbers of members or type of security interdependence. The actors that
continue to affect or to be affected by the actions of other actors in the region will
continue to be part of the RSC, whereas those that are not will be excluded.

The Middle East as a Regional Security Complex
According to Buzan and Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory, the
Middle East RSC is identified as a standard type, meaning that there are multiple
poles with no great powers or clear regional order.75 At various points throughout
modern history, there have been attempts by many contenders such as Nasser,
Ghaddafi and the Baathists to lead and become regional leaders but none of them was
successful. Even though Nasser’s effort to unify people and countries in the Arab
world through the idea of pan-Arabism had the potential to lead the regional order, it
did not last long and declined over time. Apart from being identified as a standard
type, the Middle East Regional Security Complex is characterized as “conflict
formation” because hostility dominates the interactions between actors in the region.76
In order to understand security dynamics that led to pattern of conflict
formation in the Middle East Regional Security Complex, the internal structure of this
region should be examined. The main elements in the Middle Eastern Regional
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Security that tended to form negative interdependence between actors are ethnicity,
religion, and oil reserves.77 In the Middle East, there are different ethnicities such as
Arabs, Persians, Turks, Jews, Kurds, and Turcomans. Among these, Arabs constituted
the majority of populations, whereas others are demographically dominant in different
countries like Persians in Iran, Jews in Israel, Turks in Turkey.78 The minority groups
such as Kurds and Turcomans are dispersed in different countries like Turkey, Iraq,
Iran, and Syria.79 Apart from ethnicity, religion is also diverse in the Middle East.
There are Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Muslims dominate the region except in
Israel where Jews is the majority, whereas other non-Muslims like the Armenians,
Maronites, and Orthodox are dispersed in different countries.80 Even though Islam is
the major religion, there are different sects across the region such as Sunni, Shia,
Wahabis in Saudi Arabia, Druze and Nusairis in Egypt.81 Oil reserves are another
element that created divergence in the region especially in terms of power and
influence. Many times, countries that have this power source are more powerful and
dominant than others. Furthermore, when actor in the region is equipped with power,
it will contend to be the leader of the Regional Security Complex as at different times
Saudi Arabia attempted to. These divergences, ethnicity, religion, and oil reserve,
play a significant role in the pattern of security interdependence in the Middle East
Regional Security Complex. They define the identification of “other” in a negative
way, leading to fear, suspicion, hostility, and power rivalry in the region. As a result,
Middle East Regional Security Complex becomes a conflict formation.
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Within the Middle East RSC, according to Buzan and Waever, there are three
sub-complexes: the Levant, the Gulf, and the Maghreb.82 The Levant includes Israel
and various Arab countries: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. 83 Countries in this
sub-complex are interconnected by conflict between Israel and other Arab states. This
conflict also connected other sub-complexes in the region because they were heavily
engaged in the issue especially through the Arab-Israeli conflicts that led to five major
wars in 1948-1949, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982.84The second sub-complex is the Gulf
sub-complex. It includes countries in the Gulf states and also Iran and Iraq. 85 The
main issue that characterizes this sub-complex revolves around a “triangular rivalry”
between the Gulf states, Iran and Iraq. The last one is the Maghreb sub-complex,
which is the weakest one among the three sub-complexes. It consists of Libya,
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Chad, and Western Sahara. 86 Even though there are
different security dynamics that characterized security pattern in each sub-complex,
there are some main security dynamics that connected all of them together. The most
significant one is centered on the problem of “Arab versus others”.87
In the Middle East there has been a widespread hostility against the non-Arabs
especially the Israelis, which has its root in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such
conflict triggered various interstate wars in the region throughout the history. Until
now the conflict has not yet been eased; conversely, the rivalry became more intense
due to the increased anger at the Israeli deadly attacks on the Palestinians. Apart from
ethnic dimension, religion also gets woven into hatred towards Israel. Israel represents
religious differentiation from its Arab neighbors that are mostly Muslims. As a result,
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Israel becomes the common threat denominator for the Arab world and such rivalry
makes Arab-Israeli conflict the “defining dynamic” of the Middle East RSC.88
Turkey and The Regional Security Complex Theory
According to the RSCT, the world consists of regional security complexes,
global level powers, and insulator states.89 The concept of insulator is unique and
specific to RSCT, which is used to describe countries that are at the periphery of the
regions. An insulator is not part of a Regional Security Complex and sits at the
margin between two or more Regional Security Complexes.90 Insulator is different
from a buffer state. A buffer state is in the Regional Security Complex with a role to
contain strong security patterns.91 For example, East Germany was a buffer state
throughout the Cold War because it buffered two ideological poles- Communism and
Capitalism- in the EU Regional Security Complex. In contrast, an insulator would just
inhibit the zone of relative indifference or absorb the energy of RSCs’ periphery.92
Buzan and Waever describe Turkey as an insulator because it is located at the
periphery of three regional security complexes: the European, the Middle East, and
the ex-Soviet.93 However, Buzan and Waever marked Turkey as a special kind of
insulator because it does not play a passive role as insulators usually do. Even though
Turkey seems to challenge the concept of insulator by trying to be more active in the
surrounding regional security complexes, Buzan and Waever still recognize Turkey as
an insulator since it is not able to bring different regional security complexes together
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to form its own strategic arena or to clearly present itself as a pole in any regional
security complex.94
However, it is important to note that Buzan and Waever reached this
conclusion back in 2003 when they introduced the RSCT as a grand theory in their
book, Regions and Powers. Since 2003 Turkey has been through various changes and
there have been many of the foreign policy initiatives of the AKP government. More
than 10 years later, should Turkey still be described as an “insulator”?
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Chapter 3
Turkish Foreign Policy: Islamic Agenda
The aim of this chapter is to compare Turkey’s stance on an Islamic agenda in
the pre-AKP era and current period by investigating Turkish foreign policy with
regards to the issue during both periods. Islamic agenda in this chapter is referred to
as “political Islam”. Political Islam is identified as the “irruption of Islamic religion in
the secular domains of politics”.95 In other words, it can be summed up as the use of
the Islamic elements for the political ends. However, it is important to note that
political Islam in Turkey is unique and different from that in the Arab world. It was
not used as a force to mobilize masses against colonial powers or against repressive
government as happened in Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere.96 Nor was it used as a
means to seek the Islamic polity through force and violence, even terrorism.97 In
Turkey, political Islam developed within the framework of democratic politics and a
secular state. For this reason, the political ends for using Islam was not to become an
Islamic state or replace the human law with the Shariah but rather to challenge the
strict secularity of the establishment, root in the suppressed Islamic past of the Turks,
and unleash forces that were discontent with the existing orders.98 The comparison of
Turkey’s approach toward the Islamic agenda or political Islam in the pre-AKP era
and the current period shows how Turkey’s shift in position has led to different
framing of their foreign policy. The approach of the AKP that differs from the
Kemalist establishment led to the repositioning of Turkey in the Middle East,
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resulting in the new connection between Turkey and the Middle Eastern Security
Complex.
Turkey’s Stance and Its Framing of the Islamic Agenda in the Pre-AKP Era
Turkey’s stance concerning an Islamic agenda in the pre-AKP era was not
consistent. The stance differed between periods. The difference was in terms of level
of importance, meaning that in some periods the level of disengagement is more
intense than other and in some period there has been more attempts on reengagement
than the other due to various reasons such as the commitment of individual policy
makers and changes in the power structure of the international system. Turkey’s
relation with the Middle East was very limited particularly in the early republican
period and in the post Cold War as a result of the dominance of the Kemalist
establishment. However, there was a short period of reengagement during the later
half of the Cold War period. Such attempt was proceeded by Ozal with an aim to
develop ties with the Middle East for economic benefits.
Early Republican Period
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emerged as the
nationalist leader and founder of the modern Republic of Turkey. His main goal was
to put an end to Turkey’s backwardness and develop his country to the “level of
contemporary civilization”, which mostly certainly implies Western countries.99 Due
to the perception of setting the Western countries as a model that Turkey must
achieve, Atatürk decisively cut ties with the Ottoman past, especially in terms of
religion. For Atatürk, the Ottoman Empire was just the ash of the past glory and Islam
was not allowed to tie the Turks to other Muslims because this tie would not bring
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any benefit to the country other than disaster and backwardness as it happened to the
Ottomans.100 Furthermore, the tie with Islam would force Turkey to protect the
Muslim world from Christendom, which would impede its opportunity to operate its
development scheme on the Western model.101 For this reason, Atatürk decided to
mark an end with Islam. Symbolically, he abolished the Sultanate in 1922 and two
years after the Caliphate. Politically, he applied “secularism” to eliminate religious
interference especially Islam in the government affairs.102 These revolutionary acts of
Atatürk created a lasting legacy.
Atatürk’s desire to renounce Turkey’s Islamic past and turn towards the west was
the main dynamic that defined their foreign policy in the early Republican period.
Turkish foreign policy in this period was clearly pro-Western. This pro-Western
approach consequently made Turkey a bystander in the Middle East politics. Turkey
viewed the Middle East as a region that was full of complex problems that it should
avoid getting involved with.103 Furthermore, in that period many parts of the Middle
East were still under the mandate of the Western powers, thus Islamic solidarity with
the Middle East had no benefits for Turkey; instead, it would lead to undesired
repercussions that could impede the development of the country104 Therefore,
Turkey’s relations with the Middle East were limited in this period.
Cold War Period
After the end of the World War II, there was a change in the international system
from multipolarity to bipolarity in which the two main powers-the US and the USSRbecame the dominant actors in the system. The change in the system also had an
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impact on the direction of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey, especially during the time
of Adnan Menderes’s government, attached itself to the Western bloc and defined its
interests in accordance with the Western allies.105 Therefore, Turkey attempted to
seek membership to all kind of Western institutions: it was founding member of the
United Nations in 1949, member of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation in 1948, member of the Council of Europe in 1950, member of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and associate member of European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1963.106 This engagement with the Western bloc
affected Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East especially when it came to the
Islamic agenda. In order to preserve its interest from the Western allies, Turkey
decided to disengage with any Islamic agenda that could politically bind Turkey to the
obligations. For example, Turkey rejected King Faysal’s proposal called the “Islamic
pact” in 1966.107 The pact aimed to “unite all Muslims around a common idea, to
place Islam on solid foundations, to mobilize Muslims against atheism and
communism, to create cultural union and to establish a Muslim common market”.108
The acceptance of this proposal would attach Turkey to the Islamic agenda politically;
this attachment could lead to repercussions like suspicion from the Western bloc and
the abandonment of the national principle of secularism. Therefore, in Turkey’s
perception disengagement with the Islamic agenda would benefit it most in this
circumstance.
Apart from structural dynamic related to the international system, domestic
dynamics also had an impact on Turkey’s disengagement with the Islamic agenda. In
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Turkey, the military played a significant role in politics. They regarded themselves as
the guardian of Kemalism, the revolutionary goal that has to be preserved for the
development and the stability of the state. 109 Therefore, whenever there were political
parties that tended to be associated with an Islamic agenda, these parties would be
shut down either by the military or with the help of constitutional court for violating
the principles of secularism set out in the Constitution (Preamble and Articles 2, 19,
57) and the Law of Political Parties (Law No. 648, Articles 92,93,94).110 The National
Order Party, which was the first political party in Turkey had Islamic orientation was
closed down by the constitutional court in 1971. 111 Another Islamic oriented party
founded in 1972, the National Salvation Party, was outlawed by military coup in
1980. 112 These parties were banned on the ground that they posed threat to the
principle of “secularism”. 113
Despite military tutelage in Turkey, the coup in 1980 had repercussions on
internal transformations especially during Ozal’s government. The coup largely wiped
out many political parties that were credible opposition and political rivalry of the
Ozal government.114 For this reason, it seemed that Ozal was granted more freedom to
operate his policy and move out of the established line. Therefore, Turkish foreign
policy began to be shaped in a different direction especially toward the Middle East.
Ozal focused on improving relationship with the Middle East specifically
economically. Ozal focused on improving relationship with the Middle East
particularly in the economic aspect. He emphasized the uniqueness of Turkey’s
historical dynamic and geostrategic location; he held the Ottoman past in high-regard
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and insisted on good relations with those that shared common values particularly the
Muslim world to seize new economic opportunities in the Middle East. This proactive
foreign policy of Ozal is known as “Neo-Ottomanism”, which later became one of the
cornerstones of the AKP’s foreign policy.115 Ozal’s desire in improving relationship
with the Middle East provided Turkey with economic benefits because the region was
an important market for Turkey’s export.116 Therefore, it can be deduced that the
Islamic agenda in Turkish foreign policy was limited because it could be deemed as
the violation of the principles of secularism. However, at some point, particularly
during Ozal’s government, an Islamic agenda in Turkish foreign policy was framed
out of the Kemalist line and attempted to achieve rapprochement with the Middle East
for economic benefit.
Post Cold War Period
Ozal’s proactive foreign policy towards the Middle East still continued in the
post-Cold War during his presidency. However, his initiatives were not proceeded by
his successors because they resorted to the traditional approach.117 Therefore, the
Islamic agenda in Turkish foreign policy and the rapprochement with the Middle East
were abandoned. In late 1990s, there was an attempt to redevelop an Islamic agenda
and improve relations with the Middle East by the Turkish Islamist leader, Necmettin
Erbakan. Erbakan encouraged the strengthening of Turkey’s Islamic values and
develop closer relations with the Middle East instead of the West.118 However, his
ideas were deemed as a threat to the principle of secularism. For this reason, in 1997
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the military played a leading role in ousting Erbakan from power.119 Therefore, it can
be concluded that Turkish foreign policy in this era was still based on the Kemalist
pro-Western approach.
Turkey’s Stance and Its Framing of the Islamic Agenda in the AKP Era
Turkey’s stance on the Islamic agenda in the AKP era is quite different from the
Kemalist approach. The regime made use of Islamic values in its foreign policy to
culminate closer ties with the surrounding regions especially with the Middle East.
This change indicates new direction of Turkish foreign policy, which abandoned the
reactive foreign policy of the past and removed it with the proactive one. The
proactive foreign policy in the AKP era is the product of Ahmet Davutoglu’s
initiatives. Davutoglu was appointed foreign minister of Turkey in 2009, he
nevertheless was the chief foreign policy advisor to Erdogan’s government since
2002.120 The main guidelines in Turkish foreign policy derived from his book
“Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position”, which was published in 2001.121
The two main components of the Strategic depth doctrine, which is also known as the
“Davutoglu doctrine”, are geographical depth and historical depth.122 Historical depth
is when the country is “at the epicenter of (historical) events”, whereas geographical
depth is “part and parcel of historical depth”. According to Davutoglu, Turkey is
situated in the central place within its unique geography that is rich in common
culture and history inherited from the Ottoman Empire.123 For this reason, the
strategic depth of Turkey can act as a facilitator to enhance relations with countries
that were territories of the Ottoman Empire and maximize its interest in those regions.
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Since Ottoman heritage is the main dynamic for Turkey’s strategic depth, the AKP
saw the potential of using Islamic value as a means to facilitate Turkey’s rise to be the
leading power in the Muslim world. Accordingly, Turkish foreign policy in the AKP
era stresses a strong Islamic agenda.
Turkey’s strategic depth provided Turkey with ambition to play a hegemonic
role in the Ottoman territories; however, the presence of the EU in the Balkans and
Russia in the Caucasus limited Turkey’s chance to penetrate into those regions. For
this reason, the Middle East remains the only area where Turkey could increasingly
exercise its activism. 124 For Turkey, regional leadership in the Middle East could not
be achieved easily due to its traditional foreign policy operated by the Kemalists,
which looked to the West and abandoned Ottoman Islamic values. These approaches
of Turkey in the past era created a negative perception among Middle Eastern
states.125 As a result, any Turkish policies toward the region tended to be perceived as
an imperialistic mission, equating Turkey with “proxy” of the West.126 For Turkey to
successfully reposition itself in the region, the attitude towards Turkey as “other” has
to be eliminated. As a result, the AKP has recreated Turkey’s image by putting an
emphasis on Islamic characteristics in Turkish foreign policy because Islam is the key
unifying dynamic in the region. The Islamic agenda has been framed by the AKP in
their foreign policy in three different ways: Turkey as the defender of Islam, Turkey
as the model for other Muslim countries, and Turkey as a bridge connecting the
Muslim world with that of the Christians.
The AKP puts emphasis to Turkey’s contribution to the Middle East as the
defender of Islam. Being a defender of Islam means protecting the Islamic value
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system from the outside attack.127 This assumed role of Turkey could be seen from the
AKP’s desire to protect their fellow Muslims, the Palestinians, from the outsider’s
attack of Israel. Furthermore, many times the AKP seemed to prove its role of
“defender of Islam” by discrediting Turkey’s adoption of the Western model and its
engagement with the EU. For example, in Erdogan’s statement claiming that, “ We
did not imitate the arts and sciences of the West but unfortunately its immorality.”128
From this statement, the AKP underlined Turkish adoption of the Western model as
the imitation in terms of industrial development only, and the Western value in this
respect did not erode the Islamic values that the AKP embraced at all. With regards to
Turkey-EU relation, Ali Babacan who was the former Chief Negotiator with the EU
argued that the relation was operated to see whether or not a Muslim country like
Turkey could become part of the Christian Union.129 He also added:
We always thought the EU is a big peace project ... but then the enlargement
process literally stalled. The open-door policy is no longer there... Moreover,
one of the big themes about why Turkey cannot become a member of the
European Union is because it is a Christian club. This is in our view very, very
dangerous... Everyone is looking at what is going on. And what kind of
Europe, what kind of European Union we are going to be seeing in the future
is going to be of immense importance in terms of what kind of message our
region gets.130
This attempt of the AKP to associate Turkey’s accession to the EU with expectations
of the Muslim world shows that Turkey assumed the role of the defender of Islam.
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The AKP tended to present Turkey as the representative of the Muslim world in the
European Union, representing its Islamic identity in the organization that is
dominated by the Christians.131 This similar approach towards Turkey-EU relation
was also expressed by Erdogan when he said, “Turkey’s future does not depend on
EU membership, but the future of Christianity and Islam does”.132
Since Turkey does not have enough military power to shape the Middle East,
the AKP decided to rely on soft power known as the “Turkish Model” to facilitate
their ambition. The Turkish model refers to Turkey’s economic and political system
that could successfully prove that Islamic values and liberalization can co-evolve.133
The achievement of Turkey in its economic development and the promotion of
democracy encouraged the AKP to intensify its position as a champion for Islamic
rights in the region because Turkey serves as a model that other Muslim countries
should imitate. The following statement of Abdullah Gul, former President of Turkey,
shows the AKP’s attempt to set Turkey as a model for other Arab-Muslim countries.
I challenge the view that modernity and democracy based on the rule of law,
political and economic participation, and gender equality cannot exist in the
Muslim world. The Turkish experience proves otherwise...We have chosen
integration with the world rather than isolation and reclusion; cooperation in
place of confrontation; reform instead of inertia.134
Islamic agenda has been used by the AKP in framing its role as a bridge
connecting the Muslim world with that of the Christians. According to K.J. Holsti, the
bridge role is based on the communication function, meaning that it is the actor that
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would convey information between peoples from different cultures.135 The bridge role
was the idea that was first introduced by the Islamist movement leader in Turkey,
Fethullah Gullen, when he met Pope John Paul II in 1998 to enact interfaith
dialogue.136 This initiative inspired the AKP to apply such a role to Turkey because as
the inheritor of the Ottoman legacy and defender of Islam, the country can act as a
bridge connecting the Muslim world with that of the Christians. Such attempt can be
seen from Erdogan’s co-sponsoring of the “Alliance of Civilizations Forum”, which is
a forum that aims to develop intercultural and interreligious dialogue and
cooperation.137 Apart from that, the later statements of Erdogan that disagreed with
the clash of civilization rhetoric also indicated the AKP’s attempt to act as the
initiator of interreligion dialogue between the Christian and Muslim worlds:
Istanbul brings Europe and Asia together. Istanbul is the intersection of
Europe, Asia and Africa. However, more importantly, Istanbul is a melting pot
for different cultures, civilizations, races, religions and languages, and holds a
righteous position in the world for that...In this age, where the communication
spreads swiftly and the whole world has turned into a small village, our motto
is we cannot let societies have inadequate information on one another or have
false or biased opinions on one another.138
These new approaches of the AKP in the new era indicate changes in Turkish
foreign policy. The AKP called for the new understanding of Turkey’s root in both
historical and cultural aspects with the aim to put an end to Turkey’s alienation from
the Ottoman past. This estrangement from its historical ties forced Turkey to play a
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peripheral role in the region, resulting in the loss of various political and economic
opportunities. For this reason, the AKP set the historical and religious elements as
integral parts in their foreign policy. They put an emphasis on its Islamic agenda and
make use of it to increase Turkey’s interest in the Middle East and reposition its role
in the region. The new roles of Turkey as the defender of Islam, model for the Muslim
world and initiator of interrelation dialogue provided Turkey with new opportunities
to engage with the Muslim world and become part of their circle. For instance, the
Turkish national was elected as secretary general of the Organization of OIC and
Turkey was granted the observer status in the Arab league.139 Furthermore, Turkey
could play a prominent role in the D-8, which is also known as the G-8 of the Muslim
world.140 Therefore, it can be concluded that the Islamic agenda is obviously
presented in the AKP’s approach that it transformed the direction of Turkish foreign
policy to be more involved with the Middle East and led to the new repositioning of
Turkey in the region.
Dynamics Leading to Policy Change
Since changes in Turkish foreign policy with regards to an Islamic agenda
occurred after the AKP came to power in 2002, this raises questions about the causes
of the change. The policy of states could be the consequences of different dynamics.
Therefore, this section of the thesis will identify those dynamics that generated the
AKP’s new approach on the Islamic agenda. The explanation of policy change with
regards to the issue in the AKP era could be divided into two levels: international and
domestic. The international dynamics are the weakening of the EU dimension in
Turkey and the loss of the US influence after the invasion of Iraq. For the domestic
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explanation, the dynamics include the background of the core leadership of the AKP,
the disempowerment of the military in Turkey, and the strengthening of the AKP’s
domestic power.
International dynamics
The opposition to Turkey’s EU accession bid is one of the international
dynamics that has an impact on the change of Turkish foreign policy. Since the
creation of the Republic of Turkey, the West had always been a reference point of
Turkey’s development, thus Turkey attempted to seek membership in many Western
institutions. Turkish-European integration was one of the key ambitions of Turkey.
The attempt dated back in 1959 when Turkey first submitted its application for
membership, which resulted in the acceptance of Turkey as an associate member of
the EEC.141 After the initial EEC application in1959, Turkey still made several
attempts to become part of the EEC; however, the applications had always been
deferred due to Turkey’s inability to meet its political standards. In 1999, four
decades after the initial application, Turkey was granted a candidate of the EU.142
Since then the EU accession looked more likely; the support of the public toward EU
membership was high. However, EU as a reference point for Turkey’s policy began to
lose its prominence after the official talks in 2005. The negotiation process between
Turkey and EU concerning Turkey’s membership was paralyzed due to fierce
opposition from some European states like France, Germany, Austria and Greek
Cypriots.143 In addition to that, negative signals from European elites and public also
affected domestic support for Turkey’s membership in the EU. This is for example,
the “Muhammad Cartoons Crisis” and Pope Benedict’s speech in 2006. The
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Muhammad Cartoon Crisis is the result of the depiction of Prophet Muhammad as a
cartoon in the Danish newspaper.144 Pope Benedict’s speech in 2006 led to a
controversy because during his lecture on "Faith, Reason and the University", he
quoted the Byzantine Emperor’s opinion about Islam, “Show me just what
Muhammad brought that was new and there you will find things only evil and
inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached”. These
episodes had an impact on the Turkish public perception toward EU membership. The
perceived negative attitude of Europeans towards Islam made many Turks question
the compatibility of Islamic and Western identities.145 As a result, there has been a
dramatic decline in the support for EU membership in the Turkish public.146 The
weakening of the EU dimension in Turkey encouraged the AKP to look for other
region as an alternative. And the Middle East seems to be the fittest choice where
Turkey could possible and potentially play an active role to pursue its interests. In
order to engage with the Middle East, the AKP set the historical and religious element
as integral parts in their foreign policy. Therefore, the Islamic agenda is largely
emphasized in the AKP era.
Another international dynamic that led to policy change in the AKP era is the loss
of the US influence in the Middle East. After the second Bush administration in 20052009, the US influence in the region began to wane. The erosion of the US power
gave rise to many influential actors in the regional arena.147 This is for instance, the
Lebanese war in 2006 empowered the Islamist Hezbollah due to their region-wide
resistance against Israel and the Gaza war in 2008-2009 made the Islamist Hamas on
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of the key players in regional politics resulting from their resistance against Israel.148
Furthermore, many players were able to gain influence through the mediator role in
major conflicts like Qatar in the Lebanese war.149 For this reason, the AKP looked at
this dynamic as an opportunity to increase their influence in the region because
Turkey had the potential to serve the role of mediator. In order to perform such role
effectively, Turkey has to reengage with the Middle East. And this could be done
through the rapprochement of Turkey’s Islamic value that could help bring Turkey
more in tune with the region.
Domestic dynamics
At the domestic level, the political ascendance of the AKP tended to be the most
important dynamic in explaining change in Turkish foreign policy. One of the
dynamics is related to the background of the core leadership of the AKP. The
background of the key figures in the AKP is affiliated with religious and cultural ties
with the Arab/Islamic world.150 Erdogan is a pious Muslim and he graduated from
religious vocational high school; Gul worked at the Islamic Development Bank in
Saudi Arabia from 1983 to 1991; Davutoglu was a professor at the International
Islamic University of Malaysia from 1990 to 1993.151 These backgrounds and
experiences of these key figures in the AKP means that they would naturally adopt
Islamic values in their personal lives as well as in the political spheres. Many of the
AKP’s such as increasing the number of religious schools152, encouraging girls to
attend these schools153, instilling Islamic norms in the state’s secular schools154,
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strengthening the role of Islamist bureaucrats in the government155, and using media
to restore Islam’s societal role156, support this observation. Therefore, it can be
deduced that the background of the key leaders in the AKP influenced the direction of
Turkish foreign policy, which led to the integration of political Islam in the policy.
Many actions of the AKP had direct consequences on the reorientation of
Turkey’s foreign policy; one of those is their victory over the military in the 2007
crisis. Throughout the history of modern Turkey, the military always played a
significant role in politics because they acted as a guardian of secularism. In various
occasions the military intervened in politics when the policies of the government
tended to threaten national principles. Thus, politicians especially those from the
Islamist camp did not have enough freedom to operate policies as they wanted. The
Islamists have always been looked at with suspicion by the military because they are
more likely to adhere to Islamic fundamentalism.157 Accordingly, they have always
been accused of their hidden anti-secular agenda, which many times led to the coup
and the closure of the Islamic parties.158 The AKP attempted to eliminate the threat by
imposing the charge of Ergenekon (ultranationalist covert network) on the rival
military.159 Ergenekon is the name used to dub the alleged conspirators who incited
armed insurgency to overthrow the AKP.160 Many of the military generals were
charged because the grenades and explosives were found in their houses, thus they
were accused to have some ties with the group.161 This is the first time in the history
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of Turkey that those who were accused of the alleged coup were put on trial.162 As a
result, numbers of military officers were detained along with the writers, editors, and
professors who were accused of the same charge.163 This investigation was used as a
tool to cleanse the secular opponents of the AKP. For this reason, the AKP had more
freedom to operate their policy and integrated the Islamic elements into it without
being threatened by the Kemalist establishment. This freedom also provided the AKP
with a chance to redefine the role conception of Turkey. Davutoglu’s strategic depth
analysis generated the new role conception of Turkey as a potential regional power. In
order to achieve this ambition, Turkey has to expand its soft power. The soft power of
the AKP must be based on the unifying character of the Middle East, which is Islam.
Therefore, the AKP focused on Turkey’s Ottoman past and Islamic values because
these elements could be claimed as Turkey’s legacy to attain leadership in the region.
Furthermore, the AKP’s embrace of Islam would mark Turkey’s termination of the
estrangement of Middle East as it did in the past era. By doing so, the former negative
perception of the Middle Eastern states toward Turkey could be changed, providing
new opportunities for Turkey to form closer ties with the region.
Another domestic dynamic is related to AKP’s domestic legitimacy and the
preservation of the party’s voter base. The main supporters of the AKP are the
Anatolian middle class. This group became a significant factor in Turkish politics
since 1983 due to Ozal’s neo-liberal economic policies.164 The new market economy
generated the new middle class in the Anatolian region. Despite the economic
development, this new middle class still maintained a strong tie to the small town and
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villages of Anatolia.165 Therefore, these groups are attached to the Islamic values with
which they are familiar and that were taught since their young age.166 Nevertheless,
they do not see economic development as the enemy of the Islamic values.167 For
them, Islam and modernity can co-exist. Since the AKP shares the same ideology,
they became the main supporters of the party. For this reason, the AKP’s focus on the
Islamic agenda and the reengagement with the Muslim world can be seen as the
attempt to boost the party’s domestic popularity and preserve voter base.
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Chapter 4
Turkish Foreign Policy: Israeli-Palestinian Issue
The aim of this chapter is to compare Turkey’s stance on the Israel-Palestinian
problem in the pre-AKP era and the AKP era by investigating Turkish foreign policy
with regards to the issue in both eras. Furthermore, this chapter will further
investigate into Turkish-Israeli relation because it is an important factor in depicting
how Turkey framed the issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Two pictures of TurkishIsraeli relation, one in the pre-AKP era and the other in the AKP era, represent
different stances of Turkey. The change highlights the new priorities of Turkish
foreign policy in the AKP era. The new approach of the AKP that differs from the
traditional perspective led to the repositioning of Turkey in the Middle East,
indicating the new connection between Turkey and the Middle Eastern Security
Complex.

Turkey’s Stance and Its Framing of the Israeli-Palestinian Problem in the PreAKP Era

Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the major unifying dynamic in the Middle East
because it represents the shared sense of Islamic solidarity in the region and the anticolonial struggle against the Western domination in the Middle East. The stance of
Turkey on the Israeli-Palestinian problem in the pre-AKP era had always been
supportive of the Palestinian cause. However, during the Cold War Turkey also tried
to maintain its good relation with Israel. Therefore, Turkey’s stance on the IsraeliPalestinian issue in this period was mainly based on equidistant policy. Despite the
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continued support for the Palestinian cause in the post Cold War period, Turkey
obviously developed closer relation with Israel that they finally formed cooperation
covering several substantial areas. Turkish-Israeli relation in this period was based on
pragmatism. The cooperation was formed for the best interest of Turkey in those
circumstances. However, Turkey’s cooperation with Israel caused a backlash because
it created a negative perception among Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors and
Turkey had been questioned of its sincerity in fighting for the Palestinian cause. For
this reason, Turkey’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue during the post Cold War
period was different from the Cold War era. Turkey did not maintain an equidistant
policy but preferred to cultivate closer relation with Israel than with Palestine.

Cold War
In the aftermath of the WWII, the change in the world system had an impact
on the direction of Turkish Foreign policy. Turkey’s threat perceptions from the
USSR encouraged it to ally with the Western bloc in order to contain the threat.168 As
a result of this orientation, Turkey received assistance within the framework of the
Truman Doctrine. For this reason, Turkish interest in this era was coincided with that
of the West especially of the US.169 For the US, its interest in the Middle East lied in
the creation of its alliance in the region as part of its global alliance formation.170 The
strong US support of Israel in the region influenced Turkey’s decision to become
Israel’s regional partner. For this reason, there had been an attempt on Turkey’s side
to develop its relation with Israel. One of the attempts was Turkey’s recognition of the
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state of Israel on 28 March 1949 – the first Muslim nation to do so.171 The growing
tension between the two camps in this period encouraged Turkey to form an alliance
in the Middle Eastern states called the “Baghdad Pact” to counter the Soviet threat in
the region.172 Despite Turkey’s effort to pull all Muslim countries together to confront
Soviet threat, the alliance resulted in failure. This is because these Muslim countries
in the region did not perceive the USSR as a threat; instead, the only threat in the
region for them was Israel.173 Furthermore, the coup in Iraq in 1958 was another
destabilizing factor that had an impact on the Baghdad Pact and marked an end to the
alliance.174
The failure of the Baghdad pact pushed Turkey to reexamine its relation with
Israel. As a result, during the secret visit of Israeli prime minister to Turkey in 1958,
both countries signed a pact known as the “Phantom Pact”.175 The pact is the
agreement between the two countries to cooperate in the military, diplomatic and
security issues.176 It is widely agreed that this pact is the seed of the formation of
strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel in 1996.177 Even though there had
been a close cooperation between Turkey and Israel, Turkey also tried to maintain its
relation with Palestine through its opposition against the division of Palestinian
territories in the UN voting.178 Therefore, it can be seen that despite Turkey’s
cooperation with Israel, Turkey still wanted to maintain an officially equidistant
policy to avoid being dragged into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In the 1960s, especially in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 (Six
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Days War), there was a change in Turkey’s approach toward Israel. This change was
the result of the public opinion toward the issue, which was very supportive of the
Arab and Palestinian cause.179 For this reason, Turkey suspended military cooperation
with Israel and did not allow the US to use its Incirlik Military Airbase to support
Israel during the 1967 war.180 Furthermore, Turkey agreed and voted for the Yugoslav
resolution, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops.181 In the 1973 war,
Turkey also operated a pro-Palestinian stance by not allowing the US to use Turkish
military facilities and the airbases to help Israel.182 Another instance of support for
Palestinian cause was its recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the
Palestinians and allowing it to open an office in Ankara.183
Even though Turkey expressed its active support for Palestine in various ways,
Turkey was still cautious of not being dragged into the problem or considered as part
of the conflict. This is because the Turkish-Israeli relation was crucial in limiting the
negative impact of US lobbies against the interest of Turkey. 184 Turkey was in need
of Jewish lobbies in supporting Turkey against the Armenian and Greek lobbies, thus
maintaining relation with Israel was for the interest of Turkey’s security.185 For this
reason, Turkey still attempted to implement its equidistant policy in the region by
maintaining its relation with Israel. Turkish Prime Minister Turghut Ozal in 1986
declared that Turkish-Israeli relation was a result of Turkey’s practical needs and, in
order to look for solutions to the problems of the Middle East, Israel had to be
included.186 Turkey’s attempt to maintain its relation with Israel can also be seen from
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its opposition against the decision at the Rabat Summit Conference to cut diplomatic
ties with Israel and its opposition to a resolution in 1989 that called for the revoking
of Israeli representation in the UN.187
Post Cold War
The fall of the USSR marked the end of rivalry between the two superpowers,
which allowed Turkey more freedom to operate its policy without causing tensions
with Russia. During the 1990s, this period signaled an increasing relation between
Turkey and Israel. Turkish-Israeli relation started off with the development in the
issues like tourism, culture and education; several agreements were signed between
the two countries during the visits of Turkey’s Culture Minister to Israel in 1992 and
1993.188 Following the agreements, there were several reciprocal visits of
representatives of the two countries, including official contacts at the level of heads of
states.189 The major turning point occurred in 1996 when several significant
agreements were signed between the two countries: the Military Training and
Cooperation Agreement in February, the Free Trade Agreement in March, and the
Defence Industry Cooperation Agreement in August.190 Such close cooperation
between the two countries, especially in the area of military cooperation, caused a
major uproar in the Arab public opinion and negative perception toward Turkey
because their cooperation was perceived as “anti-Arab alliance”.191 The reasons
behind Turkey’s decision to cooperate closely with Israel could be divided into three
main groups. Firstly, Jewish lobby in the US politics was still essential for Turkey in

187

Ibid.
Ibid., 121.
189
Ibid.
190
Ibid, 122
191
Vural, “The Middle East As A Regional Security Complex”, 80.
188

52
preserving its interest against the Armenian and Greek lobbies.192 Secondly, Turkey
was in strained relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria because they were supporting the
PKK, which Turkey saw it as a threat to its security.193 Therefore, Turkish-Israeli
relation could help create deterrence against Turkey’s neighbors. And lastly, Turkey
could cement its relation with the US. This is because as part of the US scheme to
operate the “New World Order”, it was in need of strong allies in the Middle East. For
this reason, the US positively supported the increased level of Turkish-Israeli relation.
The example of the US support of Turkish-Israeli relation could be seen from the case
of Reliant Mermaid in January 1998, which the US joined Turkey and Israel in the
military exercises in the Mediterranean.194 The anxiety of the Middle Eastern states
toward the Turkish-Israeli cooperation can be seen from criticisms in the OIC meeting
and at the Arab League, which called for the reconsideration of the cooperation.195
Despite Turkey’s approach toward Israel, Turkey also tried to balance its
policies with Palestine. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the state of
Palestine as declared by the Palestinian National Council.196 Furthermore, Turkey was
the first country whose head of government, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, visited
President Arafat in Gaza.197 During this period, Arafat also visited Turkey several
times. As a result of their good relation, an agreement on the Cooperation in
Education and Cultural Affairs were officially signed between the Turkish and
Palestinian governments. The public opinion in the country was very supportive of the
Palestinian cause, thus Turkish government tried its best to not pursue its policy
toward Israel at the expense of its relation with Palestine. Despite the attempt to
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maintain its relation with Palestine, Turkey’s stance was no longer based on an
equidistant policy. This is because the 1996 agreement between Turkey and Israel
marked a substantial change in Turkey’s approach, which decided to develop closer
tie and cooperation with Israel.
Turkey’s Stance and Its Framing of the Israeli-Palestinian Problem in the AKP
Era
In the AKP era, there has been a change of stance toward Turkey’s relation
with Israel. The divergence slowly increased and Turkey’s interest to develop close
cooperation with Israel gradually decreased to the point that caused crisis situation
and almost brought them to the edge of war. In this period, the AKP expressed a clear
stance toward the Palestinian cause, making clear that Turkey is fully supportive of
Palestine and ready to harshly criticize every action of Israel against the Palestinians.
In a nutshell, it can be said that Turkey in the AKP era no longer tries to position itself
at an equal distance from Israel and the Palestinians.
Turkish-Israeli relation began to change during the coalition government of
Ecevit in 2001 as a result of the second Intifada in 2001.198 However, the deterioration
of Turkey’s relation with Israel gained full momentum in the AKP era. The AKP
became critical of Israel’s harsh policies toward Palestine and its people. This was the
case, for example, in the aftermath of the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh
Yassin, when Erdogan postponed his visit to Israel.199 The AKP’s criticism of Israel
started to get more intense after Israel attacked the refugee camps in Rafah by arguing
that it wanted to eliminate the tunnel that was used to smuggle weapons Egypt.200
This operation of Israel that led to the deaths of civilians and the demolition of several
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houses was strongly criticized by Erdogan.201 Erdogan blamed Israel’s operation as
state terror.202 In response to Turkey’s strong criticism of Israel’s action against the
Palestinians, Israeli Foreign minister Shalom expressed Israel’s dissatisfaction with
Turkey’s open criticism.203 The reciprocal criticism of Turkey and Israel was a severe
blow to their strategic alignment; it revealed a change of their perceptions toward
each other, which is different from the past era.
Since 2009, crisis in Turkish-Israeli relation emerged. In response to Israel’s
prohibition to enter Gaza and meet Hamas officials, the Turkish Foreign Minister
Davutoglu cancelled his visit.204 Furthermore, Turkey cancelled a joint NATO
maneuver in Turkey, in which Israel should have participated, because Turkey’s could
not tolerate Israel’s attack on Gaza, during which more than 1400 Palestinians were
killed, and the blocking of the transfer of material for rebuilding houses in Gaza.205 At
the Davos Summit of the World Economic Forum, Erdogan strongly criticized Israel
of its attack on Gaza. He burst out and shouted at Israeli President Peres, “My voice
will not be that loud. You must know that. But when it comes to killing, you know
killing very well. I know how you hit, kill children on the beach.”206 As a result of
this harsh criticism, Erdogan was widely admired and supported by people across the
Middle East for his courage and sincerity in fighting for the Palestinians. The boiling
point that almost brought Turkey and Israel to the brink of war was the Mavi
Marmara incident in 2010207. The NGOs such as Turkish charity organization Insan
Hak ve Hurriyetleri Vakfi (IHH), Free Gaza Movement, and the European Campaign
to End the Seige on Gaza organized a flotilla to transfer humanitarian aid to Gaza but
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the flotilla was attacked by the Israeli commandos, which resulted in the killing of
nine Turkish civilians.208 Such attack of Israel on Turkish citizens was strongly
condemned by the Turkish government through the UN Security Council, NATO, and
the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Turkish President Gul warned Israel of its
inhumane action that their relation would never be the same again.209 Furthermore,
Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu described Israel’s attack on civilians as the 9/11
of Turkey.210 The crisis in Turkish-Israeli relation reached the point of Turkey’s
withdrawing of its ambassador to Israel and cancelling the joint military exercise with
Israel.211 Even though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized for
2010 killings, Erdogan repeatedly denounced it and continued his harsh criticism
against Israel.212 Following Israeli airstrikes in Gaza strip and the crackdown on
Hamas in 2014, which led to a huge number of casualties and losses especially on the
Palestinian side, Erdogan condemned and described Israeli strike as “attempted
genocide”.213 He even went further by making an analogy of Israel’s operation with
Hitler’s Nazis; he escalated the tone of criticism by saying that, “ … their barbarism
has surpassed even Hitler’s.”214 The continued strong rhetoric of Turkey in the AKP
era represents the change of Turkey’s stance toward Israel. Even though the relation is
not broken completely, the AKP’s stance is clear in not making an effort for
reconciliation. As a result, it seems that Turkish-Israeli relation is unable to reach the
point of close cooperation as it did in 1990s.
With regards to relations with Palestine, the AKP tended to concentrate more
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on the Palestinian cause, which some time had an impact on its relation with Israel as
can be seen from the consequences of AKP’s criticism of Israel’s attack on the
Palestinians. The AKP government repeatedly attempted to develop a better relation
and closer relation with Palestine. For example, both Erdogan and Gul attended
Arafat’s funeral in 2004.215 After Hamas’s victory in the election in 2006, Turkey
invited Hamas leader Meshal to Turkey.216 This invitation signified its recognition of
Hamas as a legal actor in the region; the choice of Turkey to engage with Hamas
represents a shift of policy, which has become proactive and not afraid of being
dragged into the conflicts as before. Furthermore, in order to engage more with
Palestine, Turkey came up with several initiatives to help the Palestinians; Erdogan
opened the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in Ramallah to
distribute aid provided by Turkey217; the Turkish foreign ministry sponsorship of a
Young Palestinian Diplomats Training Program218; the Turkish Chambers of
Commerce sponsorship of the Industry for Peace project to develop industry in the
Gaza strip.219
In a nutshell, it can be said that Turkey’s stance toward Israel and Palestine is
the AKP era took a decisively different direction from the previous course. Turkey no
longer tried to balance its relation with both Israel and Palestine. The AKP took a
different direction in operating Turkish foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. They decided to prioritize the Palestinian cause regardless of the
deterioration of Turkey’s relation with Israel.
Dynamics Leading to Policy Change
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Since changes in the policy of Turkey concerning its relation with Israel and the
Israeli-Palestinian problem occurred after the AKP came to power in 2002, this raises
questions about the causes of the change. The factors explaining policy change could
be the consequences of different dynamics. Therefore, this section will identify those
determinants that generated the AKP’s new approach on Turkey’s relation with Israel
and the issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The international dynamic is the
improvement of Turkey’s relation with its neighbors. For the domestic explanation,
the dynamics include the attempt of the AKP to maintain its voter base, the AKP’s
new role conception, the negative perception of the US, and the curtailment of the
role of military in politics.
International dynamic
The international dynamic that had an impact on Turkey’s policy change is the
improvement of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors, particularly Syria, Iran and
Iraq. In the past era especially in the 1990s, the close cooperation of Turkey with
Israel was primarily caused by shared security concerns. Turkey used to be in strained
relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria because they were supporting the PKK, which
Turkey saw it as a threat to its security.220 Therefore, its close cooperation with Israel,
especially in the military dimension, could help create deterrence against Turkey’s
threats. Following the victory of the AKP in the 2002 election, Turkey’s relations
with its neighbors started to normalize and improve. There were high level visits
between Turkey and Syria, and for the first time in fifty-seven years the Syrian
president officially visited Turkey.221 Bilateral agreements between Turkey and Syria
were signed covering different areas such as economy, trade, tourism, and
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education.222 In line with the rapprochement with Syria, the AKP also aimed to build
positive relations with Iran and Iraq. Erdogan visited Iran in 2004 and Turkey agreed
to sign agreements with Iran covering economy and joint security cooperation against
the PKK and PJAK, which was the Iranian branch of the PKK.223 Regarding Turkey’s
relation with Iraq, particularly with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), there
was an improvement in their relation that led to several agreements in several areas.224
This attempt of the AKP to normalize its relations with the neighbors made Turkey
less dependent on its alignment with Israel. For this reason, the AKP could operate
their policy freely toward Palestine regardless of the deterioration of its relation with
Israel.
Domestic dynamics
The AKP chose to play the anti-Israel/ pro-Palestinians card to appeal to their
conservative voter base. The main supporters of the AKP are the Anatolian
conservatives. These groups are attached to the Islamic values and have Islamic
background. Therefore, with regards to the Israel-Palestinian issue, they tended to
sympathize with Palestine as can be seen from their sensitivity toward Israeli attacks
on the Palestinians and their support of the two Intifadas. For this reason, the AKP
played the pro-Palestinians card and anti-Israel rhetoric to appeal to their domestic
voter base.
The new role conception of Turkey as a regional leader is another domestic
dynamic that brought change to Turkey’s stance toward Israel and Palestine. This new
role conception encouraged Turkey to engage more with the region. Given that the
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Israeli-Palestinian issue is the defining dynamic in the region, in order to embrace
leadership the AKP must engage with the issue as can be seen in the AKP’s desire to
speak on behalf of the Palestinians in confrontation with Israel. Furthermore, the AKP
made use of Turkey’s strategic depth, the uniqueness in Turkey’s specific location
and history, as basis to claim a legitimate role as the protector of the Palestinians. As
explained by Erdogan:
We cannot turn our back on Palestine, Palestinians and Gaza. They are asking us,
‘What is Turkey doing in Palestine?’ They are asking us, ‘What is the reason
behind Turkey’s growing interest in the Palestinian cause?’ ... They are not aware
of the responsibility that we have to take on, and this responsibility has been
granted to us by Turkish history and by the will of the Turkish people225
As already mentioned that the Palestinian problem is the defining dynamic in the
region, thus the fight for the Palestinians would highly be supported by the public. For
the AKP to successfully claim its leadership in the region, it is a must to gain public
support. Therefore, the AKP highly prioritized the issue and made a clear stance to
express its sympathy with Palestine. This is for instance, when Erdogan stormed out
of a debate with Israeli and increased his tone in criticizing Israel at the Davos Panel,
Erdogan’s action was highly praised and he immediately became the hero of the Arab
people.226 For this reason, it can be seen that Turkey’s policy toward IsraeliPalestinian problem in the AKP era is totally different from the previous era. Turkey
no longer attempts to keep an equal distance from both sides because the role of
regional leader requires Turkey’s activism and involvement in the issue.
The negative perception of the US in Turkey affected Turkey’s policy especially
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concerning its relations with Israel. One of the reasons why Turkey kept decently
good relations with Israel was to cement Turkey’s relation with the US. When there
arose anti-American sentiment in Turkey, Turkey’s approach toward Israel was likely
to be affected. Anti-Americanism sentiment in Turkey drastically increased to the
point of making Turkey known as “the most anti-American nation”.227 According to
the 2001-2008 survey, during the Bush administration Turkey was one of other 24
nations that was very critical of Bush’s policies with 89 percent negative as opposed
to 2 percent positive, whereas other Arab countries had a more tolerant approach. 228
Furthermore, in a 2008 survey Turkey ranked first in the world with a 77 percent
overall negative assessment of the US.229 The turning point in Turkish-American
relation was during the US invasion of Iraq. The focus of the US on Iraq made Turkey
uncomfortable. This is primarily because of the Kurdish issue. Turkey has long been
securitizing the Kurdish issue for fear of the rebellions and the separatist movement
conducted by the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK).230 Violent acts conducted by the
PKK in Turkey since 1984, yet violence came to an end with the capture of the group
leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999.231 However, the decision of the US to invade Iraq
and change the status quo in the country seemed to affect security of Turkey since it
helped revive Kurdish dreams of autonomy. Therefore, the interest of Turkey and that
of the US became contradicting. As a result of this interest clash, the Turkish
parliament rejected the resolution that would allow the passage of 62,000 American
troops towards Northern Iraq through Turkish territory.232 Furthermore, the tension
between the US and Turkey was exacerbated by “Sulaymaniyah incident”. The
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incident took place in the Kurdish-held northern city of Sulaymaniyah where the US
troops raided the offices of Turkish Special Forces.233 Eleven members of Turkish
force was arrested and detained by the US force claiming that they were plotting a
political assassination.234 This act of American force triggered anger among the
Turkish military that “not long afterward, reports began to arise from Turkish military
academies in Istanbul of senior military officers declaring that the US is
untrustworthy and predicting that it will become an actual enemy of Turkey”.235 Not
only on the Turkish military side that was infuriated by the act; the Turkish people
also felt displeased with the incident. The deteriorated relation with the US and the
strong wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey partly explains why the AKP was less
interested in developing cooperation with Israel. And, in order to seek for new allies,
the AKP made use of the Palestinian issue to help Turkey reengage with the Middle
East.
The curtailment of army’s role in Turkey is one of the significant factors that led
to the shift of Turkey’s policy. In Turkey, the military always played a significant role
in politics and the direction of Turkish foreign policy. The close cooperation between
Turkey and Israel in 1990s was the result of the military’s approach.236 The military
geared toward a pro-Israel policy because they would benefit from the military
training and defence cooperation in terms of intelligence and technical capacities.237
Thus the AKP’s victory over the military in 2007 and the series of electoral victories
provided the AKP with a certain amount of power to reclaim civilian authority on the
foreign policy making. For this reason, the AKP chose the Palestinian card instead of
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Israeli cooperation because it would serve two purposes: the domestic purpose is to
use the Palestinian issue as a means to gain domestic popularity because Turkish
public is strongly supportive of Palestine, whereas the regional purpose is to fulfill
Turkey’s role as a regional leader.

Chapter 5
Turkish Foreign Policy: Nuclear Policy

63
The aim of this chapter is to compare Turkey’s stance on nuclear policy in the
pre-AKP era and the AKP era by investigating Turkish foreign policy with regards to
the issue in both eras. Turkey’s stance concerning nuclear programs in the Middle
East especially of Iran reveal the new approach of Turkey toward this issue in the
region. The new approaches of the AKP that generated rapprochement with Iran and
recognized Iran’s nuclear program as a rightful action marked the divergence between
the AKP’s approach and Turkey’s previous stances on this issue. This change has an
impact on the positioning of Turkey in the Middle Eastern Regional Security
Complex because it led to the new connection between the RSC and Turkey.

Turkey’s Stance and Its Framing of the Nuclear Policy in the Pre-AKP Era
Turkey’s stance in the pre-AKP era on nuclear policy was identical with the
Western community, particularly with the US. It signed major treaties concerning the
acquisition and the use of nuclear such as Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC), and
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). This orientation toward the
Western community and Turkey’s identical stance on nuclear policy resulted from the
structure in the international system especially during the Cold war, which was
defined by rivalry between the two superpowers- the US and the USSR. This structure
had an impact on Turkish policy, which decided to attach itself to the Western bloc
and defined its interests in accordance with the Western allies.238 Turkey became the
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.239 This
membership provided Turkey with security shield especially when it came to issue of
nuclear weapons. As a member of NATO and a US ally, Turkey enjoyed the
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protection from NATO’s commitment to collective defense and the US nuclear
umbrella.240 Turkey signed agreement to host around sixty US nuclear weapons on its
territory at Incirlik Air Base close to the southern city of Adanan since 1960s.241 For
Turkey, NATO membership and the station of the US nuclear weapons in its territory
created deterrent value against the threat from other nuclear powers especially of the
USSR.242 In order to maintain this security shield, Turkey oriented its policy in
accordance with the Western allies. Therefore, when there emerged a nuclear threat in
the Middle East according to the Western perception, Turkey did not hesitate to
declare its stance in accordance with the Western community. This is for instance, the
concern over Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear program. In 1990s, Turkey declared
its stance toward the issue in accordance with the Western community, which
recognized Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear program as a threat.243 However, it is
important to note that despite Turkey’s recognition of the Iranian nuclear issue as a
threat, most of the time Turkey remained indifferent on the issue. This is because
Turkey was preoccupied with other domestic security threats like the Kurdish
problem and the PKK.244 Therefore, Turkey’s stance on nuclear policy would be best
described as an non-engagement, which did not involve much with the issue but,
when it had to declare its stance, Turkey chose to side with the Western community.

Turkey’s Stance and Its Framing of the Nuclear Policy in the AKP Era
Turkey’s stance on nuclear policy in the AKP era changed to a mediator.
However, when its role as a mediator failed to bring desired solution to the problem
of Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey’s stance toward the issue tended to be different
240

Barkey, "Turkey's Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament.", 67-68.
Kearns, Turkey, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons, 2.
242
Ibid.
243
Stein, "Turkey's Nuclear Ambitions." accessed 6 Aug. 2014.
244
Barkey, "Turkey's Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament.", 67-68.
241

65
from the Western community due to the clash of interest, particularly when it comes
to the relation with Iran.
Iran’s nuclear program became a priority in the international agenda because
there was a widespread conviction that Iran attempted to develop nuclear weapons
after the discovery of Iran’s two unaccounted nuclear facilities in 2002.245 The IAEA
investigated the issue and concluded that Iran had pursued secret programs for a long
time and there were possible military dimensions to their nuclear programs such as
activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.246 This policy
of concealment and the breaches of NPT agreement of Iran displeased the Western
community, particularly the US. However, Iran denied the accusation and explained
that their nuclear program was operated to generate electricity.247 The dispute over the
issue created tension between Iran and the Western community. For Turkey this
dispute directly jeopardized Turkey’s interests especially with regards to their policy
activism in the region. The AKP’s new strategy of “strategic depth” prioritizes
Turkey’s engagement and cooperation with its neighbors for the purposes of strategic
and economic interests. The tension over Iran’s nuclear program would force the
Western community to pressure Turkey in pursuing a more aggressive approach
toward Iran. Therefore, this would contradict the AKP’s attempt to normalize
relations with Turkey’s neighbors. Furthermore, the AKP is concerned with the
repercussions of military confrontation. This is because the repercussions of the US
invasion of Iraq directly jeopardized Turkey’s security.248 Therefore, military
confrontation between the US and Iran would also affect the region’s stability and
security, which Turkey wants to avoid. For this reason, Turkey had to abandon its role
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as an observer and became a mediator.249 Turkey would avoid supporting any military
solution or aggressive approach toward the issue and would instead prefer to adopt the
approach based on the promotion of multilateral diplomatic solution.250
Turkey believed that it could mediate between the US and Iran to reach
negotiated solution and the settlement would help liberate Turkey from the deadlock
in balancing its relation with both Iran and the US. Erdogan noted in October 2008
that Turkey used to have experience in negotiating with Iran, thus Turkey had the
potential to mediate between the US and Iran.251 In response to Turkey’s bid for
mediator position, the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton embraced it and
announced that the US would seek help from Turkey to reach agreement with Iran in
the disputed issues.252 The IAEA director general, Mohamed ElBaradei also asked
Turkey to act as a mediator to bring Iran back to the negotiation table.253 Turkey
began to approach Iran by sending Turkish diplomats to Tehran and exchanging
messages with the Iranian officials. Many attempts of Turkey could successfully bring
Iran to cooperation. In October 2009, there was a discussion in Vienna about the
agreement concerning the fuel-swap between the Security Council plus German (5+1
countries) and Iran.254 The proposal recommended that Iran could place its low
enriched uranium (LEU) in Turkey’s custody and the Vienna Group would supply
Iran with LEU for the production of electricity in exchange.255 Turkey accepted the
proposal and agreed to act as a mediator to try to bring Iran on board. Despite
Turkey’s attempt, the swap deal between the P5+1 and Iran in 2009 resulted in
failure. However, Turkey continued to engage with Iran and tried to reach an
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agreement. As a result of Turkey’s mediation effort together with Brazil – two
countries that were both non-permanent members of the UN Security Council at that
time - in May 2010 Iran finally agreed to have its uranium enriched in Turkey. 256
The aim of this Uranium Swap Agreement between Iran, Turkey and Brazil was to
relieve tensions about the Uranium Enrichment Program.
However, contrary to the expectations, the Uranium Swap Agreement did not
reduce tensions between the West and Iran. The deal instead provoked the Western
community because they were suspicious of Iran’s real intention. For them, the
agreement signed by Iran was considered “a tactical move on Iran’s part, to illustrate
that it was willing to use its nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.257 Being worried
by Iran’s nuclear ambition, the Western community agreed to level sanction against
Iran through the UN.258
The failure of Turkey to bring about an acceptable solution to this issue put
Turkey in a difficult position. Turkey did not want to take side with either the US or
Iran, but the deadlock forced Turkey to do exactly that. Even though Turkey was not
completely against the Western approach toward Iran, Turkey’s stance tended to be
different and challenged the Western stance. Turkey repeatedly expressed its support
for Iran and defended it over attacks from the West. Being displeased with the nuclear
swap deal and Iran’s nuclear ambition, the US brought the issue to the UNSC, which
resulted in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1929 with the aim to level
sanctions against Iran.259 Turkey voted against the resolution, bringing to the fore the
divergence on the issue between Turkey and its traditional allies.260 Furthermore,
during the NATO summit in 2010, Turkey protested the decision on the issue of Iran
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and refrained from describing Iran as a “threat”.261 In fact, Turkey does not perceive
Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat. Turkey supported Iran’s nuclear
program and believed that Iran has the right to pursue its nuclear program for peaceful
purposes. 262 This stance of Turkey on the issue is reflected in Erdogan’s words, “I
think that those who take this stance, who want these arrogant sanctions, need to first
give these [weapons] up. We shared this opinion with our Iranian friends, our
brothers. We want to live in a region completely purged of nuclear weapons. We want
to live in a world in which nuclear weapons no longer exist”. 263 Turkey also criticized
the hypocrisy of the West for attacking Iran’s right to produce peaceful nuclear
energy, while ignoring other countries’ possessions of nuclear weapons especially
Israel. Turkish political leaders often raised issues about Israel’s nuclear weapons;
during the party’s annual meeting, Abdulla Gul said, “ if the Iranian nuclear weapons
are dangerous, then so are the Israeli ones”.264 When asked about Iran’s nuclear
ambition, Erdogan often responded by being critical of the Western stance, “countries
opposed to Iran's atomic program should give up their own nuclear weapons, and
attacked as "arrogant" the sanctions imposed on Ankara's neighbor”. 265 In response
for Turkey’s support for Iran, Iranian President Ahmedinejad several time voiced
thanks and appreciation for Turkey.266
The support for Iran that has been expressed by Turkey was done mainly to
bolster ties for the benefit of Turkey’s economic, energy and security interests. In the
AKP period, Turkish-Iranian relation has dramatically improved and enjoyed the best
period of cooperation. Comparing to the pre-AKP era, relation between Turkey and
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Iran was not quite good due to ideological differences. The 1979 Iranian Revolution
created fear in Turkey that the Islamists in the country would imitate Iran and threaten
national principle of secularism. In addition to that, Turkey also was suspicious of
Iran that it supported the PKK and encouraged Islamic groups to engage in violent
activities.267 When the AKP came to power, the relationship between Iran and Turkey
began to change. The party’s strategy of using its “strategic depth” to pursue national
interest encouraged Turkey to normalize relations and actively engage more with its
neighbors. For this reason, Turkey did not perceive Iran as its threat and sought for
chances to improve its bilateral relation. The tie between the two countries is essential
for Turkey in terms of energy, security and economic dimensions. For this reason, the
sanction and the aggressive approach toward Iran would be a massive blow to
Turkey’s interests. Therefore, Turkey tried its best to approach the issue in a nonaggressive way by trying to mediate between the West and Iran. However, when the
failure did not bring the desired outcome, Turkey tended to prioritize its relation with
Iran by refraining from recognizing it as a threat and criticizing attacks on Iran. For
Turkey, the stance toward the militarization of nuclear power has always been
consistent that Turkey is against it. What has been changed in the AKP era is the
approach toward Iran, which has been in a milder way. The AKP chose to deviate
from its traditional stance and bolster ties with Iran in several aspects to maintain
benefits Turkey acquired from the cooperation.

Dynamics Leading to Policy Change
Since changes in the policy of Turkey concerning its nuclear policy and the
relation with Iran occurred after the AKP came to power in 2002, this raises questions
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about the causes of the change. The factors explaining the change of Turkey’s stance
could be the consequences of different dynamics. Therefore, this section will identify
those dynamics that generated the AKP’s new approach towards the issue, which are
the repercussions from the US invasion of Iraq and the erosion of confidence in
NATO’s collective defense.
Dynamics
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 had an impact on the Turkey’s approach
toward the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. The repercussions of the US invasion of
Iraq directly jeopardized Turkey’s security.268 It revived Turkey’s fear of an
independent Kurdistan. Also, the war dragged the whole region into chaos and
insecurity. Turkey never wanted such situation because the calm and peaceful region
would benefit Turkey more particularly in terms of economic development. For this
reason, military confrontation between the US and Iran would also affect region’s
stability and security. Turkey tried its best to avoid supporting any military solution or
aggressive approach toward the issue and would instead prefer to adopt the approach
based on the promotion of multilateral diplomatic solution.269 This is because Turkey
believed that aggressive approach toward the issue either military confrontation or
sanctions could not coerce Iran to follow the line set by the West, on the contrary, it
would make Iran more isolated and encircled that they had to resort to military
approach, leading to the unwanted war in the region. In order to liberate itself from
being locked up in such situation, Turkey abandoned its role as an observer and
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became a mediator with the hope to clear tension and help create peace in the
region.270
The erosion of the confidence in NATO’s collective defense is another
dynamic that led to Turkey’s adoption of milder approach on the nuclear issue. In fact
Turkey started to question the effectiveness of NATO’s collective defense and US
umbrella since 1990s. This is because of the reluctance of NATO members in
responding Turkey’s request for military assistance during the Iraq-Kuwait war.271
During the war, Turkey demanded the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force in
Turkey to prevent the threat from Saddam but NATO members rejected because they
believed that the Middle East was not in the operation zone of NATO. However,
Turkey still maintained its good relation with NATO because NATO was perceived
as part of Turkey’s western identity.272 In addition to that, its objective of EU
membership still remained an important factor for Turkey. The reluctance of the
NATO members to provide help for Turkey occurred again in 2003 and this time it
made Turkey lose confidence in NATO’s collective defense guarantee. In 2003
Turkey asked NATO to activate article 4 of the Washington Treaty to protect Turkey
from Iraq’s missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but the demand was
again rejected by the NATO members.273 Since then the perception of Turkey toward
NATO was merely an organization serving the US interest for the purpose of
becoming a hegemonic power.274 The loss of Turkey’s confidence in security shield
provided by NATO forced Turkey to depend on itself. In order to avoid being dragged
into conflicts and insecure situation, Turkey chose to normalize relations and
encourage cooperation with its neighbors. Therefore, Turkey’s stance toward Iran on
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the nuclear issue became different from the west because Turkey is more concerned
with maintaining good relation and cooperation with its neighbor for the purpose of
security and economic concerns.
The stance of Turkey that became milder toward Iran’s nuclear program is
related to Turkey’s security concern, particularly about the PKK. The issue of PKK
had a binding effect that tied Turkey and Iran together. Iran was occasionally attacked
by the PKK’s affiliate in Iran known as the Party of Free Life of Iranian Kurdistan
(PJAK). For this reason, Iran defined the PKK as a terrorist organization, thus Turkey
saw the opportunity to cooperate with Iran on the issue of eliminating the PKK’s
threat.275 On 17 April 2008, Turkey and Iran agreed to sign a memorandum of
understanding about the PKK and the statement following the 12th High Security
Commission between the two countries stated, “the increase in some terrorist
movements in the region damages both countries, and the most influential way to
battle this problem is the exchange of intelligence and security cooperation”.276 The
fact that Turkey and Iran were both vulnerable from attacks by the PKK is one of the
factors that geared up the rapprochement and cooperation between the two countries.
For Turkey, Iran is not perceived as the existential threat but a friend that they could
work together to achieve the shared interests.
Apart from the security concern, economic interest is another reason that made
Turkey avoid any aggressive stance on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. Economic
development is essential for the AKP’s rule in the country. This is because the
impressive economic growth and success was a significant factor that helped preserve
the AKP’s domestic legitimacy and popularity. Iran is one of Turkey’s important
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partners that Turkey could seek benefits from both in terms of economic dimension
and energy. Iran and Turkey are trade partners; Turkey is one of the top-five trading
partners of Iran with 5.6 per cent of total imports and exports.277 Turkey has put an
effort to raise their bilateral trade to twenty billion US dollars.278 To facilitate their
bilateral trade, in March 2009, the two countries signed a memorandum of
understanding agreeing to cooperate in air, land, and sea transportation.279 With
regards to energy, Turkey is dependent on oil and gas from Iran. This can be seen
from its deficit in its energy imports from Iran. Turkey and Iran signed several
agreements about energy cooperation. This is for instance; in February 2007 Iran
signed an agreement to let the Turkish Petroleum Corporation to explore energy
reserves in Iran.280 In addition to that, the two countries signed agreement to transport
30 billion cubic meters annually of Iranian gas through Iran and Turkey to the EU.281
Turkey is dependent on Iran for energy, whereas Iran is dependent on Turkey as the
key route to the west. This dependence between the two countries developed
cooperation for the shared benefits in several aspects. Since Turkish economy had a
fast growth rate, this pressure on the government to further improve economic
performance forced Turkey not to risk losing its important trade partner and source of
energy dependency. For this reason, Turkey tended to refrain from declaring any
aggressive stance on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Turkey has become a pole in the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex?
The methodology of this research is based on theory-guided process tracing to
reach the conclusion by using Buzan and Waever’s Regional Security Complex
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Theory as a guide to establish whether Turkey’s position under the rule of the AKP
still fits into the category of an insulator. Buzan and Waever acknowledge Turkey as
an insulator because it is located on the periphery of three regional security
complexes; the European, the Middle East, and the ex-Soviet.282 However, Buzan and
Waever described Turkey as a special kind of insulator because it does not play a
passive role as insulators usually do. Despite Turkey’s foreign policy activism, Buzan
and Waever still recognize it as an insulator since it is not able to bring different
regional security complexes together to form its own strategic arena or to clearly
present itself as a pole belonging to any regional security complexes.283 For a country
to become part of the Regional Security Complex, there must be a degree of
interconnectedness between its processes of securization or desecurization and those
of the other units in the complex.284 For Buzan and Waever, such processes do not
cover only the traditional military and political sectors but also the economic, societal,
and environmental ones.285
In order to see if Turkey has already lost its status of an insulator and become a
pole in the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex, the research investigated
Turkey’s policies in two different eras: pre-AKP era and AKP era. The Islamic
agenda, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and nuclear policy are the three main themes
that the research has focused on because they are significantly constructed as a
process of securitization that link countries in the Middle Eastern RSC together. The
research compared Turkey’s framing of the three issues and its stance in the two
periods, looking for evidence of continuity or change. In addition to that the research
also analyzed the main factor that led to the change of Turkey’s stance by analyzing
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the dynamics that led to changes of Turkish foreign policy in two different levels:
systemic and domestic. The main findings of the research indicated the change of
Turkey’s stance and the way the issues are framed. With regards to the Islamic
agenda, Turkey’s stance varied between periods. Turkey’s relation with the Middle
East was very limited in the early republican period and in the post Cold War due to
the power structure in the international system and the dominance of the Kemalist
establishment. Nevertheless, there was a short period of reengagement during Ozal’s
government but it was done purposely only for the economic benefits. The Islamic
agenda was approached and framed differently when the AKP came to power. It was
used as a foreign policy instrument to establish closer ties with the Middle East and
achieve regional leadership in the region. The change of Turkey’s stance toward the
Islamic agenda was directly influenced by the AKP’s new doctrine, “Strategic
Depth”. The doctrine encourages the AKP to make use of Turkey’s historical
dynamics and geostrategic location to engage with the neighboring regions.
Therefore, Turkey used the Islamic agenda to propel a pro-active approach toward the
Middle East, contrary to the reactive practices of the past period. The reengagement
with the Middle East in the AKP era was not done only for the economic purpose but
rather for inclusive interests and effectiveness of Turkey in the region that could help
Turkey achieve leadership status in the region whether as the defender of Islam, the
model for other Muslim countries, or as a bridge connecting the Muslim world with
that of the Christians. With regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey whether
in the pre-AKP era or the current period has always been supportive of the Palestinian
cause. It was rather the approach toward Israel that varied between periods. During
the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy could be best described as equidistant policy
because Turkey tried to balance its relation with both Palestine and Israel. The

77
equidistant approach started to lose its prominence in the post Cold War. Turkey
started to cultivate a closer tie Israel, which eventually led to the 1996 agreement
covering their cooperation in several areas. Turkish-Israeli relation began to change in
the AKP era. The AKP’s interest to develop close cooperation with Israel gradually
decreased and there was increasing support for the Palestinian cause instead. The
AKP confronted Israel and became critical of Israel’s harsh policies toward Palestine
and its people. The continued strong rhetoric of the AKP against Israel significantly
deteriorated their relations that finally reached the crisis point and almost brought
them to the edge of war. With regards to nuclear policy, Turkey’s stance in the preAKP era could be best described as disengagement. Although Turkey’s stance toward
the acquisition of the nuclear weapons was identical with the West, Turkey did not get
involved much with the issue because it was preoccupied with other security threats,
namely the Kurdish question and the PKK. When the AKP came to power, they get
involved more with the issue especially with the Iran’s nuclear program that the AKP
finally transformed the role of Turkey to a mediator. This is because the disputes and
military confrontation between Iran and the West cold directly jeopardize Turkey’s
interests and security. For this reason, the AKP attempted to mediate between the two
sides to reach a negotiated solution. The settlement would maximize Turkey’s interest
because it could help liberate Turkey from the deadlock in balancing its relation with
Iran and the West. However, the role of the Turkey as a mediator did not produce a
satisfied outcome. For this reason, Turkey’s stance toward Iran’s nuclear program
started to deviate from the West. In order to maintain a good relation with Iran for the
economic and security interests, Turkey avoided any aggressive approach toward the
issue of Iran’s nuclear program.
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The interactions between Turkey and the Middle East concerning the Islamic
agenda, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and nuclear policy became stronger in the
AKP era. Turkey made use of the Islamic agenda and the Israeli-Palestinian problem
to develop closer ties with the Middle East, whereas the milder stance of Turkey on
the issue of Iranian nuclear program signified Turkey’s attempt to approach its
neighbors. These changes are meaningful to reconsider Turkey’s position in the
Middle Eastern regional security complex. According to the Regional Security
Complex Theory, Turkey was positioned as an insulator. This position is correctly
assigned only to Turkey in the pre-AKP era but to also describe Turkey in the AKP
era as an insulator is problematic. It can be seen from the table that Turkey’s stance
in the pre-AKP era toward the three issues were very limited in this period because
Turkey attempted to distance itself from the region and the problems that they might
be dragged into. This approach signifies the insulating character of Turkey. However,
this character started to wane when the AKP came to power in 2002. The foreign
policy practices in this era on the three issues are obviously different from Turkey’s
previous foreign policy directions, showing that that Turkey is no longer attempting to
distance itself from the region. These changes indicated new connection between
Turkey and the Middle East. Even though the new pattern of interaction between
Turkey and Middle East is not strong enough to bring them together to form a new
coherent strategic arena, it is meaningful enough to present itself as part of the Middle
Eastern Regional Security Complex. For this reason, the position of Turkey in the
AKP era should be changed from an “insulator” to a “pole” in the Middle Eastern
Regional Security Complex.
This new positioning of Turkey may be countered by the argument that the
prospect of Turkey potentially joining the EU, which is still possible, cannot make it
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as a pole in the Middle East. This argument is not convincing because of two reasons.
First, the scope of this thesis is to reconsider Turkey’s position in the AKP era. And it
is obvious that, after the problems in the negotiation talk concerning Turkey’s EU
accession bid in 2005, for the AKP the EU is no longer a reference point. They then
looked for other regions as an alternative to engage with where Turkey could
effectively exercise its proactive policies and spread its influence. The reason that the
AKP still keeps the EU prospect open is not because Turkey could achieve this goal
soon but rather to prevent the internal struggle for power. The EU prospect has always
been the critical importance for Turkey, thus if the process is completely abandoned,
the rivals of the AKP particularly the old Kemalist elites could use this element to
blame the AKP and make a swift comeback.
The second reason against the argument of EU membership prospect is the
complexity of European debates, which made Turkey’s membership in the EU far
from being realistic and achievable. The debates on the impact of Turkey’s accession
to the EU are mainly concerned with issues such the size of Turkey may grant Turkey
a primary role in terms of voting rights and representation in the Council286, Turkey as
the only Muslim country contradicts EU’s identity of the “Christian Club”287,
Turkey’s membership raised fear about the invasion of Turkish migrants that already
hosted large communities in many European countries. For this reason, Turkey’s
membership met fierce opposition from various European states and negative signals
from European elites and public. Another point that has come into notice is the
accession timeline of Turkey and other candidate countries. Despite the same
complicated accession process, the accession process of other candidates took lesser
time than Turkey. The countries that used to counter the complicated accession
286
287
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process like Spain, Poland, and Croatia did not take more than a decade to achieve the
accession, whereas Turkey has been in the process for over three decades.288
Therefore, it can be seen that Turkey as a member of the EU is far from being a
realistic and achievable goal, making Turkey unable to become a pole in the EU any
time soon. And since the insulating character of Turkey began to change when the
AKP came to power because of their different approach toward the issues of Islamic
agenda, Israeli-Palestinian problem, and nuclear policy, it is logical to conclude that
Turkey has become a pole in the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex.
In addition to the comparison between Turkey’s stance on the themes of
Islamic agenda, Israeli-Palestinian problem, and nuclear policy in the pre-AKP era
and the current period to look for evidence of continuity or change, the study also
investigated the determinants that led to the changes of Turkish policy to see if they
are determined by the changes in the international and regional structure or they are
explicitly related to the AKP policies. The main findings in this scope are summarized
in the table below.

Issues

Islamic Agenda

International Dynamics

- The weakening of the EU

- The background of the core

dimension in Turkey

leadership of the AKP

- The loss of the US

- The disempowerment of the

influence after the invasion of

288

Domestic Dynamics

Tocci, Turkey's European Future, 48.
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Iraq

military in Turkey
- The strengthening of the
AKP’s domestic power

Israeli-Palestinian - The improvement of

- The attempt of the AKP to

Problem

maintain the party’s voter base

Turkey’s relation with its
neighbors

- The AKP’s new role
conception
- The negative perception of
the US
- The curtailment of the role
of the military in politics

Nuclear Policy

-

The repercussions
from the US invasion
of Iraq

- The erosion of confidence
in NATO’s collective defense

Even though the changes in Turkish policy were partly determined by the changes
in the international and regional structure, it is obvious that the AKP is the main
driving force that led to these changes. This observation is based on three factors: the
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AKP’s Strategic Depth, the AKP’s determination to embrace a new role for Turkey,
and the curtailment of the role of the military in politics. Without the initiatives and
proactive approach of the AKP, Turkey might still maintain its insulating character
and limit its engagement with the surrounding regions. One of the AKP’s initiatives
that impelled changes of Turkey’s stance and the way Turkish foreign policy is
operated is the doctrine of “Strategic Depth”. This doctrine is the backbone of Turkish
foreign policy in the AKP era that offered a pro-active policy towards the neighboring
regions contrary to the past practices. Strategic Depth acted as a facilitator to enhance
relations with countries that were territories of the Ottoman Empire and maximize
Turkey’s interests in those regions. As a result, the AKP took advantage of the
uniqueness of Turkey’s historical dynamic and geostrategic location to develop
relations with its neighbors through cultural, economic, and diplomatic interactions.
The peculiarity of the AKP that made Turkish foreign policy different from the past is
its determination to embrace new roles for Turkey. Such approach represents a
rupture with the past, since Turkish foreign policy in the past era was mainly
characterized by the unquestioning western orientation. For the AKP, the
unidimensional character of the traditional foreign policy prevented Turkey from
responding to changes in the surrounding environments, resulting in the loss of
several political and economic opportunities. Therefore, there were intense efforts to
introduce new roles for Turkey. Those roles include the defender of Islam, the model
for other Muslim countries, regional leader, moderator, and a bridge connecting the
Muslim world with that of the Christians. The determination to embrace these new
roles for Turkey were often shown and reflected in the AKP core leaders’ speeches
and interviews. In order to achieve these ambitions, the AKP reformulated policies
that led to Turkey’s new approach toward the Islamic agenda, the Israeli-Palestinian
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conflict and the nuclear policy. As a result, the changes led to the increasingly intense
engagement with the Middle Eastern affairs and the decreased interest in western
orientation. The AKP also played a significant role in curtailing the power of the
military. Throughout the history of Turkey, the military always played a significant
role in politics; many times the military would step in and intervene in politics. The
victory of the AKP over the military in the 2007 crisis reclaimed civilian authority on
the foreign policy making. As a result, the AKP could freely operate policies that
engaged more with the Islamic values, Palestinian-Israeli problem and nuclear policy
without any interruptions from the military establishment. These three factors suggest
the intention of the AKP to change the direction of Turkish foreign policy and
transform Turkey’s position from an insulator to a pole in the Middle Eastern
Regional Security Complex.
The rapprochement with the Middle East is imposed by the AKP with the
motive to achieve the role of powerful regional leader in the region. Such attempt
could be seen from Turkey’s success in transforming relations with many states in the
Middle East over the last decade. At different times, Turkey tried to act as a credible
mediator and facilitator in regional conflicts and talked to different ethnic and
religious communities with self-confidence. The AKP did not forget to grasp an
opportunity that was provided by the 2011 uprising in the Middle East to bolster
Turkey’s image as a progressive and pro-democratic Muslim government and set
Turkey as a model of the coexistence between traditional values, notably Islam, on the
one hand and the requirements of a modern life, notably secularism, pluralism and
liberalism. The success of the AKP to approach and regain Turkey’s influence in the
region is mainly through the communication with the people. The AKP’s several
condemnations against Israel’s attack on the Palestinians and the support for the
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people’s revolution against the despotic regimes in the Arab Spring bolster Turkey’s
reputation in the region. Such popularity helped facilitate Turkey’s move to become a
pole in the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex.
The new position of Turkey as a pole in the Middle East offered Turkey
opportunities to maximize its interests as the AKP expected until the outbreak of the
Arab Spring. At first, the uprisings were seen by the AKP as the opportunity to
expand Turkey’s influence in the region through the use of Turkish model. The AKP
offered strong support to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and to the opposition
group in Syria so that they could become Turkey’s political partner and key force in
the region. However, the change of the dynamics in the region in the post Arab Spring
impeded the AKP’s aspiration. The military’s coup in Egypt that overthrew the
Islamist government put Turkey in helpless situation and isolation in regional politics.
In addition to that, the situation in Syria, which became increasingly violent caused
the AKP to worry about the spillover of the conflict into Turkey’s borders. As the
clash in Syria continued, Turkey could not avoid the spillover. Turkey had to deal
with refugee crisis by accepting more than 500,000 refugees into its border.289 And
since the situation in Syria is still unstable, the return of these refugees is
unpredictable. A huge flow of refugees from Syria burdened Turkey with financial,
political and security costs. This is because the government started to lose control of
the human flow across the border resulting in the movement of smugglers, radical
Islamists, and PKK militants between the two countries.290 One of the examples of the
threat caused by this destabilizing factor is the terrorist attack in Reyhanlı, a district in
Hatay province, where 52 people were killed.291 As the conflict keeps continuing,
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threat and destabilizing factor in Turkey are growing. Therefore, stability and security
in Turkey are directly jeopardized. Furthermore, even if the Assad’s regime is
defeated, which is the desired scenario, Turkey will still have to deal with an unstable
neighborhood and the spillover of conflict remains unavoidable. Apart from the
security crisis that Turkey has to deal with, its credibility as a potential regional player
in bringing about a new regional order in the Middle East has proven to be in a
downturn, particularly following the use of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad's
regime against its opponents. The problem was not resolved by Turkey but rather by
an agreement between the US and Russia. The way in which the major global powers
dealt with such incident suggests that Turkey's concerns and priorities are not being
given due respect and attention. The crisis in Syria demonstrates that Turkey's ability
to influence the interests and policies of regional and international actors is already
limited. For this reason, there is possibility that the future shape of Turkey’s relation
with the Middle East will be changed because the AKP could no longer use its most
efficient tool of “Turkish model” in the region. In the following years, the AKP will
still continue to use the Israeli-Palestinian issue as a tool to engage and gain support
from the Arab states as well as their domestic voter base. However, the limitation of
opportunity to expand Turkey’s influence in the Middle East will possibly force
Turkey back to the position of an insulator.
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